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In Bayesian decision analysis, uncertainty and risk are accounted for with 
probabilities for the possible states, or states of nature, that affect the outcome of a 
decision.  Application of Bayes’ theorem requires non-informative prior probabilities, 
which represent the probabilities of states of nature for a decision maker under complete 
ignorance.  These prior probabilities are then subsequently updated with any and all 
available information in assessing probabilities for making decisions.  The conventional 
approach for the non-informative probability distribution is based on Bernoulli’s 
principle of insufficient reason.  This principle assigns a uniform distribution to 
uncertain states when a decision maker has no information about the states of nature.  
The principle of insufficient reason has three difficulties:  it may inadvertently provide a 
biased starting point for decision making, it does not provide a consistent set of 
probabilities, and it violates reasonable axioms of decision theory. 
The first objective of this study is to propose and describe a new method to 
establish non-informative prior probabilities for decision making under uncertainty.  
 vii
The proposed decision-based method is focuses on decision outcomes that include 
preference in decision alternatives and decision consequences. 
The second objective is to evaluate the logic and rationality basis of the proposed 
decision-based method.  The decision-based method overcomes the three weaknesses 
associated with the principle of insufficient reason, and provides an unbiased starting 
point for decision making.  It also produces consistent non-informative probabilities.  
Finally, the decision-based method satisfies axioms of decision theory that characterize 
the case of no information (or complete ignorance).   
The third and final objective is to demonstrate the application of the decision-
based method to practical decision making problems in engineering.  Four major 
practical implications are illustrated and discussed with these examples.  First, the 
method is practical because it is feasible in decisions with a large number of decision 
alternatives and states of nature and it is applicable to both continuous and discrete 
random variables of finite and infinite ranges.  Second, the method provides an 
objective way to establish non-informative prior probabilities that capture a highly non-
linear relationship between states of nature.  Third, we can include any available 
information through Bayes’ theorem by updating the non-informative probabilities 
without the need to assume more than is actually contained in the information.  Lastly, 
two different decision making problems with the same states of nature may have different 
non-informative probabilities. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Decision making is a fundamental aspect of engineering.  When selecting the 
most preferred decision alternative, a decision maker builds a set of decision alternatives, 
seeks how much satisfaction or dissatisfaction would occur, and analyzes what is known 
and what is uncertain happen.  Decision theory provides a rational framework to make 
decisions. 
Because decisions are usually made under uncertainty, a probabilistic approach is 
used in decision theory to represent uncertainty.  Bayesian decision theory is widely 
used in various fields of research and practice, including economics, business, medicine, 
and engineering.  In a Bayesian decision framework, probabilities on the available 
information are established through Bayes’ theorem.  Bayes’ theorem provides a logical 
method to combine a probability distribution with previous knowledge and new 
information. 
Since the early age of probability theory, there has been controversy concerning 
the probability distribution with previous knowledge, which is represented by a prior 
probability distribution.  The controversy is about the prior probability distribution 
under no previous knowledge (no information or complete ignorance), which is called a 
non-informative prior probability distribution.  The issue has been pointed as a 
weakness of Bayesian approach because there has been no clear method to establish non-
informative prior probabilities, yet these prior probabilities affect the updated or posterior 
probabilities and therefore the decision. 
A conventional method for establishing non-informative prior probabilities is the 
principle of insufficient reason.  The principle was used implicitly in Bayes (1763) and 
 2
Laplace (1814) and explicitly in Tribus (1969).  There are extensions of the principle of 
insufficient reason: Jeffreys’ rule (Jeffreys, 1961), and a data translated likelihood (Box 
and Tiao, 1973).  Tribus (1969) indicated that the principle of insufficient reason is a 
special case of the application of the principle of maximum entropy, and Jaynes (1957), 
who proposed the principle of maximum entropy, addressed that the principle of 
maximum entropy may be regarded as an extension of the principle of insufficient reason.   
However, the principle of insufficient reason has difficulties in the application to 
decision making problems.  First, the principle of insufficient reason fails to provide a 
rational starting point for decision making.  A non-informative prior probability 
distribution based on the principle of insufficient reason may yield a bias in a decision 
because it focuses on equally probable outcomes in uncertain variables.  From this 
notion, decision alternatives may have different preferences over one another even in the 
state of complete ignorance.  Second, non-informative prior probability distributions 
from the principle of insufficient reason may vary with the definition of a sample space 
for uncertain variables.  The principle of insufficient reason assigns uniform 
probabilities to a sample space but using a different sample spaces may produce different 
probabilities.  Efforts to define a unique sample space where the uniform probabilities 
should be assigned were made by Jeffreys (1961), Box and Tiao (1973), and Sinn (1980).  
However, there is no widely accepted and clear answer for the unique sample space.  
Third, the principle of insufficient reason fails to satisfy reasonable axioms for decision 
theory in the case of complete ignorance, as shown in Luce and Raiffa (1957).  This 
study will propose a new method to establish non-informative prior probabilities for 
decision making under uncertainty, in an attempt to overcome these difficulties. 
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1.2 MOTIVATION 
This study was initially motivated by Journel and Deutsch (1993).  Journel and 
Deutsch performed a case study with waterflood simulation performed on stochastic 
realizations for heterogeneous porous media.  They compared the responses obtained 
from three random function models used in stochastic simulations with different spatial 
entropy.  They observed that the responses have a larger variance for random function 
model with larger entropy, and that the responses have smaller variance for the opposite 
case.  Both of the responses, effective permeability of the heterogeneous porous media 
and the late breakthrough time, showed the same behavior.  Journel and Deutsch 
concluded that  
“Maximum entropy of the random function model does not entail maximum 
entropy of the response distributions; in fact, the contrary is observed for the flow 
performance predictions studied above.” 
 
Journel and Deutsch show that applying the principle of insufficient reason (or the 
principle of maximum entropy) to the states of nature in a decision making problem is not 
a rational approach and could lead to under-representing the degree of uncertainty in the 
outcomes of the decision.   
A real-world example of large variability in oil production because of 
heterogeneity is the Holstein field in the Gulf of Mexico (Appendix A). 
  
1.3 OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this dissertation is to formulate and study a decision-based 
method to establish a non-informative prior probability distribution for decision analysis.  
This dissertation is to evaluate the hypothesis that the decision-based method is rational, 
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practical, and that it is an improvement over the principle of insufficient reason.  The 
evaluation will be made on the following basis: 
 
1. Does the decision-based method produce rational and reasonable results? 
2. Can the decision-based method be applied consistently and practically so that a 
decision maker always gets the same starting point for the same problems? 
3. Does the decision-based method satisfy the axioms of decision theory? 
 
1.4 APPROACH 
Approach to satisfy the objective is as follows: 
1) State and explain the decision-based method to establish unbiased and rational 
starting point for decision making. 
2) Study the decision-based method considering rationality, consistency and 
defensibility.   
3) Develop a practical algorithm for assigning the non-informative prior 
probabilities to the states of nature. 
4) Apply the decision-based method to practical decision making problems in 
engineering.  The three example problems involve oil recovery from 
heterogeneous porous media and making decisions about oil production 
facilities.  The examples will illustrate the process to establish non-
informative prior probabilities and also highlight practical implications of the 
decision-based method. 
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1.5 ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
In Chapter 2, basic concepts and definitions related to Bayesian decision analysis 
under complete ignorance will be introduced.  The purpose of this presentation is to 
define a clear context for this research and to provide a background on decision theory.  
Chapters 3 and 4 are about the principle of insufficient reason, the principle of 
insufficient reason and its extensions, to establish non-informative probability 
distributions.  In Chapter 4, challenges in the application of the principle of insufficient 
reason are addressed.  The decision-based method for establishing non-informative prior 
probabilities is described in Chapters 5 and 6.  The rationale and a practical algorithm 
for implicating the method are provided.  In Chapter 7, the decision-based method is 
applied to practical engineering decision making problems.  Conclusions about the 
decision-based method for non-informative priors are provided in Chapter 8.  In 
appendices, the result of history matching of oil well production in the Holstein 
(Appendix A), a computer code for the algorithm of decision-based method (Appendix 
B), a derivation of modified tank model (Appendix C), and a computer code for the two-
dimensional grid simulator of oil production used in the dissertation (Appendix D) are 
provided. 
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Chapter 2. Bayesian Decision Theory and State of Complete Ignorance 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Decision theory is originated from the observation of human behavior when 
making a decision and has been developed to understand how to make a rational decision 
(Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Luce and Raiffa, 1957).  The questions that decision 
theory tries to answer are about how to determine the best alternative (decision criteria), 
how to incorporate uncertainty, and how to interpret existing information such as 
statistical data and experimental results.  Science, management, and economics are 
involved in decision theory and its application covers most of the fields of study. 
Bayesian decision theory is a division of statistical decision theory.  As shown in 
its own name, Bayesian decision theory is based on the Bayesian definition of probability 
(probability as a degree of belief) in contrast to frequency probability (Nagel, 1939; 
Jaynes, 1968; Vick, 2002).  The probabilities are used to illustrate the uncertainty 
involved in decision parameters and accordingly, decision outcomes. 
The objective of this chapter is to clarify concepts used as background. 
 
2.2 RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING  
2.2.1 Decision and Utility 
Decision making is the process of finding the most preferred alternative among a 
set of alternatives (or options, actions, strategies).  The process is a sort of optimizing 
based on maximizing satisfaction or on minimizing dissatisfaction.  The optimized 
solution is the most preferred alternative, which has the largest measure of satisfaction.  
Consequence is defined as the measure of satisfaction made by the outcome of a decision.  
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Consequence in engineering decision is normally expressed in terms of monetary value, 
such as net present value.  A widely used and generic representation of consequence is  
utility, a quantitative measure that is ordered so that a large value means greater 
preference by the decision maker. 
The modern theory of utility was developed by Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944).  A utility function relates the consequence of a decision to a variety of attributes 
affecting the consequence, such as monetary value.  Figure 2.1 shows three example 
utility functions expressing different attitudes toward changes in an attribute.  If a 
decision maker is risk aversive, a utility function has a steeper slope where the attribute is 
least preferred.  Conversely, a utility function for risk affinitive decision maker has a 
steeper slope where the attribute is most preferred. 
 
Monetary Value, x
Utility (x)
Worst
Case
Best
Case
Risk Affinitive
Risk Aversive
Risk 
Indifferent
 
Figure 2.1 Example of utility functions 
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2.2.2 Risk, Uncertainty, and Probability 
In deterministic view point, a decision alterative produces a known consequence, 
which represents the satisfaction or preference for a decision maker.  Deterministic 
decision making is simply a comparison between the consequence from each decision 
alternative and determining the alternative with the most favorable consequence.  A 
deterministic approach is not practical in decision making problems in the real world 
because of the lack of understanding how the state of the world is and how it works as 
well as the imperfect knowledge about which the future would be.  In real world, there 
are multiple possible consequences because there is a possibility of success (or gain) and 
a possibility of failure (or loss). 
The risk is the possibility of loss.  Risk comes from the uncertainty of what the 
outcome of an alternative would be.  Uncertainty can be classified into various sources 
(Joint Committee on Structural Safety Probabilistic Model Code 2001): intrinsic physical 
or mechanical uncertainty, model uncertainties, and statistical uncertainties.  The first 
type corresponds to aleatory (Type 1) and represents inherent natural variability.  Model 
uncertainties of inherent actual variability are due to imperfect or imprecise models and  
statistical uncertainties are due to a limited amount of information about inherent 
variability.  Both model and statistical uncertainties are categorized into epistemic (Type 
2) uncertainties.  All types of uncertainties should be taken into account in decision 
analysis (Faber, 2005). 
Probability theory provides a method to describe uncertainty mathematically.  
How likely an uncertain event will occur is represented by probability density function 
(PDF) for continuous variables or by probability mass function (PMF) for discrete 
variables.  
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2.2.3 Risk-Based Decision Making Problems 
Risk-based decision making is equivalent to decision making under uncertainty.  
Decision making has three components: a set of alternatives, a set of possible states of 
nature (states of the world, or scenarios), and consequences associated with an alternative 
and a state of nature.  The following sections will provide a background on the theory of 
making decisions. 
 
2.2.3.1 Decision criteria 
Kelsey and Quiggin (1992) summarized the historical and theoretical background 
and major differences of these decision criteria.  For symbolic description, suppose we 
have a decision making problem with n alternatives (A1, A2, …, An), m states of nature 
(s1, s2, …, sm), and consequences in utility (uij, i=1,2,…, n, j=1,2,…,m). 
Historical criteria include the maximin, minimax, and Hurwicz criteria.  In the 
maximin criterion, the index for Ai is assumed to the minimum among possible 
consequences, min(ui,1, ui,2, …, ui,m).  This assignment is indexing the worst state for 
each alternative.  A decision maker chooses the alternative with maximum index as an 
optimal.  The minimax risk criterion is suggested by Savage (1951).  This criterion 
begins with a definition of loss (risk, or regret in some literature):  Lij=max(ui1, ui2, …, 
uim)-uij for a given sj.  The loss, Lij replaces the utility consequence, uij in the decision 
making problem.  The index imposed to each alternative is determined by taking the 
maximum loss possible, max(Li1, Li2, …, Lim) for a given alternative.  The best 
alternative is chosen by picking the one with the minimum index, in other words, the one 
with minimum risk.  While maximin and minimax risk criteria are based on the worst 
case, the Hurwicz criterion introduces the other way to avoid the pessimistic viewpoint.  
Hurwicz (1951) introduced a new index called the pessimism-optimism index, which is 
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symbolized with α.  The index is assigned to each alternative, Ai and equal to α×min(ui1, 
ui2, …, uim)+(1-α)×max(ui1, ui2, …, uim).  If α=1, Hurwicz criterion is the same with 
maximin utility criterion and if α=0, it is the same with maximax utility criterion. 
All decision criteria above are based on human behavior about the risk in decision 
making.  The attitude toward risk was pessimistic for maximin and minimax risk criteria 
and controllable for Hurwicz criterion.  Those criteria do not incorporate probabilities 
on states of nature so that a decision maker ignores the likelihood of occurrence of each 
state.  The most widely accepted and defensible criterion is based on the maximum 
expected utility.  This criterion incorporates the probabilities on states of nature, P(Sj), 
j=1, 2, …, m.  The expected utility for Ai is calculated by making a summation of the 
products, P(Sj)×uij for all j states.  The basis for using maximum expected utility is 
provided by many authors, including Bernoulli (1738), Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944), and Kelsey and Quiggin (1992), and it is supported by a set of axioms that have 
been widely accepted as rational and reasonable.  For example, Luce and Raiffa (1957) 
expressed these axioms in a set of nine.  The preferred decision alternative is the one 
with the maximum expected utility.  In this study, maximum expected utility criterion is 
accepted and used. 
 
2.2.3.2 Decision matrices and trees 
A symbolic description for decision making can be illustrated by a decision 
matrix, as shown in Table 2.1.  The decision matrix is a convenient tool to summarize a 
simple decision making problem with alternatives, states of nature, and consequences.   
A decision tree provides a graphical way to illustrate a decision making problem.  
It provides a systematic way to integrate decision components: the decision alternatives, 
the uncertainty (in terms of the states of nature and the probabilities assigned to those 
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states), and the consequences (in terms of utility) in decision making problems.  Figure 
2.2 is an example of decision tree.  A square node is called a decision node where a 
decision maker makes a decision, and a circular node is a chance node which represents 
the uncertainty.  Therefore, branches stemming from the decision node are alternatives, 
A1 through An, and those from the chance node are possible states of nature, S1 through 
Sm.  Probabilities are assigned to each state of nature.  The expected utility for an 
alternative is equal to the summation of the product of probabilities and consequences. 
The tree structure enables to illustrate not only a complicated decision structure, 
but also a causal relationship between events.  A present decision comes first and then a 
future decision follows.  A certain event or decision affects events along the pathway so 
that the probability of a following event should be conditional to a leading event. 
 
 
Table 2.1 Example of a decision matrix  
  States of Nature 
  S1 S2 … Sm 
A1 u11 u12 … u1m 
A2 u21 u22 … u2m 
: : :  : 
Decision 
Alternatives 
An un1 un2 … unm 
Probabilities P(S1) P(S2)  P(Sm)
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A1
A2
Ai
An
P(S1)
P(S2)
P(Sj)
P(Sm)
S1
S2
Sj
Sm
States of 
NatureAlternatives Probabilities Consequences
u11=u(A1,S1)
u12=u(A1,S2)
u1j=u(A1,Sj)
u1m=u(A1,Sm)
 
 
Figure 2.2 Basic decision tree 
 
 
 
2.2.3.3 Prior, posterior, and preposterior decision 
The basic decision structure shown in Figure 2.2 is called a prior decision in 
Bayesian decision theory.  The qualifier “prior” refers to before any new information 
becomes available.  There exist some variations from the prior decision according to the 
availability of new information on states of nature.  A posterior decision, shown in 
Figure 2.3, is an updated decision tree based on incorporating new information.  A 
posterior decision making problem is basically the same with prior decision making 
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problem.  The new information is used to update probabilities on states of nature, 
P(Si|Information, I).  A preposterior decision, shown in Figure 2.4, is a decision to 
consider the potential value that new information might have before the information is 
obtained.  The decision alternatives for preposterior analysis are a Go-No go decision 
about purchasing new information.  In engineering examples of new information 
includes database, site exploration data, sampling, or modeling.  The root node in Figure 
2.4 is the decision about purchasing new information.  If a decision make decides to 
purchase new information, the outcome of having new information should follow the 
branch stems from the root in the decision tree.  The outcome is represented by a chance 
node because there is uncertainty in the outcome of the information.  This uncertainty is 
caused by the fact that a decision maker is making a decision without knowing what the 
new information would be.  Each branch of the possible outcome of the new 
information, Ii, is followed by the decision structure of posterior analysis with updated 
probabilities on states of nature.  
 
A1
A2
An
P(S1|I)
P(S2|I)
P(Sm|I)
S1
S2
Sm
u11=u(A1,S1)
u12=u(A1,S2)
u1m=u(A1,Sm)Information, I
 
Figure 2.3 Decision tree for posterior analysis 
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A1
A2
An
P(S1|I1)
P(S2|I1)
P(Sm|I1)
S1
S2
Sm
u11=u(A1,S1)
u12=u(A1,S2)
u1m=u(A1,Sm)Information, I1
A1
A2
An
P(S1)
P(S2)
P(Sm)
S1
S2
Sm
u11=u(A1,S1)
u12=u(A1,S2)
u1m=u(A1,Sm)
Information, I2
Information, Ik
A1
A2
An
P(S1|I2)
P(S2|I2)
P(Sm|I2)
S1
S2
Sm
u11=u(A1,S1)
u12=u(A1,S2)
u1m=u(A1,Sm)
Purchasing
Information
No Purchasing Information
 
Figure 2.4 Decision tree for preposterior analysis 
 
These three types of decision trees can cover various practical decision making 
problems.  Faber (2005) categorizes engineering problems as decision making problems, 
as shown in Table 2.2.  Each engineering decision making problem has a corresponding 
decision structure among the three types.  As well as to make a decision, preposterior 
decision analysis is used to assess value of information (VoI, VI) or value of technology.  
The value of information is equal to the difference between the expected utility of two 
decision alternatives, “No purchasing information” and “Purchasing information.”  If 
the information is totally useless, that is, the information does not help to infer how likely 
 15
each state of nature would be at all, the VoI is equal to zero.  If the information contains 
more information on the likelihood of the states of nature that possibly changes the prior 
decision, VoI would increase.  The upper bound of VoI is called the value of perfect 
information (VPI).  In the same manner with VoI, the VPI is the difference in the 
expected utilities between “No purchasing information” and “Purchasing perfect 
information.”  Perfect information means that the information source is able to inform 
which of states of nature would occur with certainty.  The preposterior decision tree in 
Figure 2.4 can be modified for estimating VPI, as shown in Figure 2.5.  The conditional 
state probabilities, P(Si|Ij), in a VPI analysis have values of 0 when i≠j and 1 when i=j. 
 
Table 2.2 Categorization of engineering problems as decision making problems (based on 
Faber, 2005) 
Decision theoretical problem Engineering problem 
Prior 
• Risk assessment for verification 
• Design and strengthening optimization 
• Calibration of risk acceptance criteria 
• Calibration of code formats (γ, ψ) 
Posterior 
• Reliability updating for service life extensions 
• Reliability updating for re-qualification 
Preposterior 
• Planning of collection of information (tests, 
experiments, and proof load levels) 
• Inspection and maintenance planning 
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A1
A2
An
P(S1|I1)=1
P(S2|I1)=0
P(Sm|I1)=0
S1
S2
Sm
u11=u(A1,S1)
u12=u(A1,S2)
u1m=u(A1,Sm)I1: S1 will occur
A1
A2
An
P(S1)
P(S2)
P(Sm)
S1
S2
Sm
u11=u(A1,S1)
u12=u(A1,S2)
u1m=u(A1,Sm)
A1
A2
An
S1
S2
Sm
u11=u(A1,S1)
u12=u(A1,S2)
u1m=u(A1,Sm)
Purchasing
Information
No Purchasing Information
P(S1|I1)=0
P(S2|I1)=1
P(Sm|I1)=0I2: S2 will occur
Ik: Sk will occur  
Figure 2.5 Decision tree for the value of perfect information analysis 
 
2.3 BAYES' THEOREM 
2.3.1 Bayes’ Theorem 
Bayes (1763) theorem relates a marginal and conditional probability, as shown in 
Equation 2.1.  P(A) is a prior probability distribution, P(A|B) is a posterior probability 
distribution, and P(B|A) is a likelihood function that relates those two probability 
distributions. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )BP
APA|BPB|AP =
 (2.1)
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Bayes’ theorem can be interpreted as a learning process if the event A is assumed 
to be the states of nature and B is available information.  Bayes’ formulation can be 
expressed, as shown in Equation 2.2.  In this viewpoint, P(A) is equivalent to a 
probability distribution on the states of nature, P(Si) before having the new information 
and P(A|B) is an updated probability distribution by the new information, 
P(Si|Information).  The information may include both objective and subjective 
information, for example, field and lab test results, experts’ opinions, and knowledge 
from a database. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )∑
=
=
=
StatesofNumber
1j
ii
ii
ii
i
SPS|nInformatioP
SPS|nInformatioP
nInformatioP
SPS|nInformatioPnInformatio|SP
 (2.2)
 
Since Bayes’ theorem was formulated, it has been questionable that which should 
be the prior probability distribution, P(Si) in Equation 2.2.  Berger (1985), Kass and 
Wasserman (1994), and Carlin and Louis (1996) summarized and discussed about the 
methods to establish the prior probability distribution.  It is an important and critical 
question because a different prior probability distribution may yield a different posterior 
probability distribution.  Suppose we have two cases that have different prior probability 
distributions, as shown in Figure 2.6, but the same likelihood function in Figure 2.7.  By 
Bayes’ theorem, the updated probability distributions for both cases can be calculated.  
As shown in Figure 2.8, the posteriors are different from each other. 
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Figure 2.6 Two different prior probability distributions 
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Figure 2.7 Likelihood function from available information 
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Figure 2.8 Two different posterior probability distributions from the different prior and 
the same information 
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2.3.2 Bayesian Approach in Decision Making 
The Bayesian approach provides a method to incorporate new information into 
the probability distribution that takes a previous knowledge into account.  The resultant 
probability distribution, which is called posterior distribution, varies with what the 
information implies about an uncertain variable.  In decision making problems, the 
uncertain variables are the states of nature and the probabilities on the states in prior 
decision analysis can be interpreted as prior probabilities.  If new information comes 
available such as an information branch in posterior or preposterior decision trees 
(Figures 2.3 and 2.4), the probabilities at the terminal branches requires Bayesian 
framework to reflect the new information.  In this Bayesian framework, the conditional 
probabilities to certain information are posterior probabilities. 
Figure 2.9 illustrates a preposterior Bayesian decision example.  For the 
alternative of not purchasing additional information, the probability mass function on an 
uncertain variable, x is assumed to be probabilities at the top of Figure 2.9.  For the no 
purchasing alternative, this probability distribution is used to optimize the following set 
of alternatives, A1 and A2.  For the other alternative of purchasing information, there are 
two possible outcomes from the information.  Because the probability distributions for x 
at each terminal are conditional to the leading branches (events), each probability 
distribution following certain information is updated through Bayesian updating.  Info. 1 
reveals that the small value of x is more likely.  This new information and the previous 
knowledge are incorporated to yield the updated probability distribution shown in the 
second to the top.  In the same manner, posterior probability distributions regarding 
Info. 2 are established. 
 
 20
Purchasing
Information
Not Purchasing Information
Info. 1
Info. 2
PDF
P(x)
P(x|Info. 1)
P(x|Info. 3)
← P(x)    &   P(Info. 1|x)
← P(x)    &   P(Info. 2|x)
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Figure 2.9 Probability mass functions in a Bayesian preposterior decision analysis 
 
The importance of the prior probability distribution in decision making can be 
illustrated with the example in a previous section with two different priors shown in 
Figure 2.6, the same likelihood function in Figure 2.7, and the two subsequent posteriors 
in Figure 2.8.  Suppose we assign a decision framework by the decision matrix in Tables 
2.3 and 2.4.  Prior probabilities as in Case 1 have the second alternative, A2 preferred to 
the first alternative, A1 because the expected utilities for both alternatives, A1 and A2 are 
3.5 and 5.2, respectively.  For prior probabilities as in Case 2, A1 is preferred to A2 
because the expected utilities are 7.6 and 1.9, respectively.  This example shows that 
different prior may produce different posterior and change an optimal decision. 
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Table 2.3 Decision matrix for Case 1 
States of Nature Expected 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Utility 
Decision A1 10 10 0 0 0 3.5 
Alternatives A2 0 0 8 8 8 5.2 
Probabilities  0.15 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.15  
 
Table 2.4 Decision matrix for Case 2 
States of Nature Expected 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Utility 
Decision A1 10 10 0 0 0 7.6 
Alternatives A2 0 0 8 8 8 1.9 
Probabilities  0.33 0.44 0.11 0.07 0.05  
 
 
2.4 COMPLETE IGNORANCE 
2.4.1 State of No Knowledge 
The state of complete ignorance is the state of maximum uncertainty.  The state 
is also called deep uncertainty because a decision is made under no knowledge of 
correlation and probability distributions of the variable (Lempert et al., 2006).  It should 
be noted that the terms, uncertainty and risk sometimes are used in different meanings.  
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In some literature, “risk” refers the situation that a decision maker knows the probability 
distribution for states of nature and “uncertainty” means that even the probability 
distribution is unknown (Luce and Raiffa, 1957).  In this study, the state of complete 
ignorance is equivalent to the state of “uncertainty” in Luce and Raiffa’s terminology.  
The condition of complete ignorance does not mean that the decision maker is totally 
blind to the states of nature.  The decision maker knows a set of possible states of the 
nature and consequences corresponding each state for a given alternative, but does not 
know how likely each state would be. 
 
2.4.2 Non-Informative Probabilities 
The likelihood of each state of nature under complete ignorance is called a non-
informative probability.  Non-informative prior probabilities correspond to a prior 
decision making problem under complete ignorance.  For prior decision making 
problems with information, the probability distribution for states of nature is 
P(Si|Information) in Equation 2.2.  The prior probability, P(Si), in a Bayesian framework 
is equivalent to P(Si|Sample space or Set of all possibilities).  P(Si|Sample space) is 
referred as just “prior”, “gentle prior” (Pratt, 1995), or “non-informative prior”.  It will 
be called a non-informative prior probability distribution in this study. 
The non-informative prior probability distribution is an important factor in 
decision making.  The reason is that the non-informative prior probability distribution is 
a starting point for a decision.  The non-informative prior affects a decision because it is 
a basis of posterior probability distribution, expected utilities of each decision alternative, 
and ultimately a final decision.  All decisions that include information are actually 
posterior decisions.  The influence of the non-informative prior is shown with a simple 
example in the previous section (Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 and Tables 2.3 and 2.4).  
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Because of this importance, it has been argued for many years (centuries) about what is 
the most logical and reasonable method to establish a non-informative probability 
distribution.  Unfortunately, there has been no satisfactory answer fulfilling 
mathematical, theoretical, and rational requirements.  The following two chapters will 
explain and discuss the principle of insufficient reason for establishing a non-informative 
prior probability distribution. 
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Chapter 3. Non-Informative Probabilities and the Principle of 
Insufficient Reason 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to review principle of insufficient reason to obtain 
a non-informative probability distribution.  This review addresses the most widely used 
method, the principle of insufficient reason and its practical implementation through the 
principle of maximum entropy. 
 
3.2 PRINCIPLE OF INSUFFICIENT REASON 
In conventional decision making problems or probability assessment problems 
with no information, people intuitively assign equal probabilities to the states of nature 
when there is no evidence or belief that any state is more likely than the rest of states.  
This idea is originated by Bernoulli and Laplace at the early age of probability theory, 
and is generally called the principle of insufficient reason.  Keynes (1957) preferred to 
name it the principle of indifference.  This principle supports the use of rectangular or 
uniform probability distributions in a situation of complete ignorance.  The principle is 
also widely accepted in various fields of research (Walstrom et al., 1967; Benjamin and 
Cornell, 1970; Ang and Tang, 1975; Jensen et al.,1997; Seigneur et al., 1999; Rechard 
and Tierney, 2005). 
Assigning the same probabilities for every state of nature is the main idea of the 
principle of insufficient reason.  This idea is called equiprobability.  Laplace (1814) 
restricted the application of equiprobability within equipossible events.  From this 
equipossibility concept, the principle of insufficient reason assigns the same probabilities 
on the events of the same possibility.  The notion of equipossibility seems vague to 
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define clearly.  It is evident that the challenge in defining a sample space for the 
application of the principle of insufficient reason has been noticeable from the beginning 
of probability theory.  In Section 3.4, other efforts made for defining the sample space 
for states of nature where the principle of insufficient reason is applied to will be 
presented. 
 
3.3 PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM ENTROPY 
3.3.1 Entropy as a Measure of Uncertainty 
The concept of entropy was introduced in thermodynamics to describe the second 
law of thermodynamics.  Entropy describes the degree of disorder or the state of the 
dispersed energy.  Entropy can also be used to measure how much a probability 
distribution is diffused and accordingly, for how much uncertainty the probability 
distribution has. 
This use of entropy is supported by information theory.  Shannon introduced a 
concept of entropy into information theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949).  The entropy, 
which had been used as a measure of disorder in thermodynamics, was proved as a 
reasonable measure of uncertainty.  Their definition in the measure of uncertainty, H 
begins with the case where a set of n possible events has probabilities of occurrence, p1, 
p2, …, pn.  The requirements for the measure of uncertainty are: 
1. H should be continuous in the pi. 
2. If all pi are equal, in other words, pi is equal to 1/n, H should be a monotonic 
increasing function of n. 
3. If an uncertainty is broken down into following uncertainties, the original H 
should be the weighted sum (expected value of sub-uncertainty) of the individual 
values of H. 
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The meaning of requirement 2 is that the uncertainty increases if the number of 
states of nature increases.  It is reasonable because the increment of the number of states 
becomes additional unknowns mathematically, and represents a higher order of 
uncertainty to describe the state.  Requirement 3 is about the situation where a certain 
possible state is broken into sub-cases.  For consistency, a measure of uncertainty 
should have the same value for both of the uncertainty structures shown in Figure 3.1 and 
Equation 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Decomposition of uncertainty structure 
 
     ( )n1iimii2ii1i1i21 p,,p,pp,,pp,pp,p,,p,pH KKK +− ×××  
        ( ) ( )imi2i1in21 p,,p,pHpp,,p,pH KK −=  
(3.1)
 
 
From the derivation based on the properties, a mathematical definition of the 
entropy as a measure of uncertainty, symbolized by H, is shown in Equation 3.2.  The 
Equation 3.2 is for discrete probability distributions.  For continuous probability 
distributions, the measure of uncertainty is given by relative entropy (see Section 4.5.1) 
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pn 
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because the value of the measure in Equation 3.2 approaches infinity in the limiting 
process of transformation from the discrete to the continuous case (Baker, 1990).   
 
H = ( ) ( )( )∑
=
−
n
1i
ixix xplnxp          (3.2)
 
Equation 3.1 can be used to illustrate the requirement 2, as shown in Figure 3.2.  
The definition of H satisfies the requirement 3, as shown in Equation 3.3. 
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Figure 3.2 Entropy versus the number of states for illustrating the second requirement for 
the measure of uncertainty in Shannon and Weaver (1949) 
 
Estimated only with the probabilities, the entropy does not depend on the values 
of a variable.  Therefore, an entropic approach is applicable whether a variable is 
numeric or descriptive.  This feature is useful if the uncertainty model is based on the 
discrete probability mass function (PMF) where each class has a corresponding range of a 
variable. 
Table 3.1 shows the entropy for various PMFs.  The number of classes is 10 and 
each class is assumed to have a value between 1 and 10 in ascending order.  In addition, 
for comparison purpose, the variance of each PMF is also shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Comparison of variance and entropy as a measure of uncertainty 
Case PMF 
Entropy 
(Rank) 
Variance 
(Rank) 
 
Case PMF 
Entropy 
(Rank) 
Variance 
(Rank) 
1 
 
2.303 
(1) 
8.25 
(4) 
 
6 
2.183 
(2) 
11.583 
(3) 
2 
2.183 
(2) 
4.917 
(7) 
 
7 
2.151 
(4) 
6 
(5) 
3 
2.151 
(4) 
6 
(5) 
 
8 
2.135 
(6) 
4.853 
(8) 
4 
2.135 
(6) 
4.853 
(8) 
 
9 
1.936 
(8) 
14.573 
(2) 
5 
0.693 
(9) 
20.25 
(1) 
 
10 
0.693 
(9) 
0.25 
(10) 
  
There are general remarks for the results in Table 3.1.  The variance increases 
with the probability distribution far from the average.  This is why there exists PMFs 
having greater variance than the uniform distribution (Cases 6, 7, and 9).  The entropy is 
the same for PMFs having the same set of probabilities whatever the order of those 
probabilities.  Because the entropy is calculated only by probabilities, the order of the 
probabilities does not matter.  Therefore the concave and convex shaped PMFs have the 
same entropy as each other (Cases 2 and 6, 3 and 7, 4 and 8, and 5 and 10). 
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The variance is not necessarily a good measure of uncertainty, specifically when 
the PMF is concave-shaped to down.  Case 5 shows the largest variance but seems very 
ordered.  The PMF of Case 5 is not the uniform distribution, but the distribution of 50-
50 chance for both extremes.  This probability distribution is the one with less 
uncertainty rather than the one with the most uncertainty.  This limitation is caused by 
the nature of variance.  Variance measures the distance from the average, therefore the 
concave shaped PDF has more variance than the uniform distribution.  While the 
variance fails to measure the uncertainty in some cases, entropy works well as a measure 
of uncertainty.  The PMF of maximum uncertainty is Case 1, which has a uniform 
probability distribution.  For defining the maximum uncertainty, it is generally 
appropriate to make use of entropy. 
 
 
3.3.2 Non-Informative Probabilities from Principle of Maximum Entropy 
Tribus (1969) indicated that the probability distribution with maximum entropy 
and no information (constraints) is the uniform distribution, and that the principle of 
insufficient reason is a special case of the application of the principle of maximum 
entropy.  The principle of insufficient reason, assigning the same probability or uniform 
distribution to uncertain parameters, has a mathematical support from the principle of 
maximum entropy.  Jaynes (1957) addressed that the principle of maximum entropy 
may be regarded as an extension of the principle of insufficient reason. 
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Chapter 4. Difficulties in the Application of the Principle of Insufficient 
Reason 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Establishing non-informative prior probabilities based on the principle of 
insufficient reason is seemingly intuitive to understand and simple to apply.  Therefore, 
it is widely used in estimation, prediction, and decision making problems (Walstrom et 
al., 1967; Benjamin and Cornell, 1970; Ang and Tang, 1975; Jensen et al., 1997; 
Seigneur et al., 1999; Rechard and Tierney, 2005).  In this study, the focus is narrowed 
to non-informative probability distributions for decision making problems.   
In this chapter, three major difficulties with the principle of insufficient reason 
when applied to decision making problems will be discussed.  The first difficulty is that 
the non-informative probabilities can inform or bias a decision.  The second difficulty is 
that this principle does not provide a consistent set of non-informative probabilities in 
practice.  The third difficulty is that this principle is not consistent with axioms of 
decision theory in the case of complete ignorance.  The first difficulty is a unique notion 
of this research while the second and the third ones already have been revealed by many 
literatures. 
 
4.2 BIAS IN DECISION 
The principle of insufficient reason assigns the same probabilities to the states of 
nature.  The fundamental idea of the principle of insufficient reason is that a complete 
ignorance is equivalent to the most uncertainty in states of nature.  However, this idea 
can mislead a decision making into a biased decision.  Suppose a decision maker has a 
decision making problem with two alternatives and three possible states of nature, as 
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shown in Figure 4.1.  The principle of insufficient reason would mean that the three 
states have the same probability of ⅓. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Decision tree for simple example 
 
The preference in decision alternatives for each state is shown in Table 4.1.  
Alternative B is preferred to Alternative A in States 1 and 2, while Alternative A is 
preferred in State 3.  Therefore, the probabilities that one decision alternative is 
preferred to the other can be calculated, as shown in Figure 4.2.  The probability that 
Alternative A is preferred to Alternative B is equal to the probability of State 3, ⅓.  The 
probability that Alternative B is preferred to Alternative A is ⅔, as P(State 1)+P(State 
2).  Alternative B is more likely to be preferred than the other because P(Alternative A> 
Alternative B) is less than P(Alternative A< Alternative B), where “<”, “>”, and “~” 
denote the inequality or equality in preference.  By assigning equal probabilities to 
Alternative A
⅓State 1
State 3
State 2
Alternative B
State 1
State 3
State 2
Utility 
0 
2 
1 
3 
0 
2 
Probability
⅓
⅓
⅓
⅓
⅓
 33
states of nature, a decision maker makes Alternative B more likely to be preferred.  This 
principle unintentionally instills the bias in decision because the decision is not 
considered in assigning the probabilities. 
 
Table 4.1 Preference in alternatives for each state 
Utility 
State 
Alternative A Alternative B 
Preference outcome 
(Preference in decision alternatives) 
State 1 0 3 Alternative A < Alternative B 
State 2 1 2 Alternative A < Alternative B 
State 3 2 0 Alternative A > Alternative B 
 
 
0
0.5
1
Alternative A>Alternative B Alternative A>Alternative B
Probability
Preference outcome
1
3
2
3
 
Figure 4.2 Bias in decision 
 
 34
This difficulty with the principle is related to what Journel and Deutsch (1993) 
concluded.  Journel and Deutsch observed that the input for reservoir heterogeneity 
model with the maximum entropy could provide the response (effective permeability and 
late breakthrough time) with minimum entropy.  In the same manner, a decision maker 
may have decision alternatives with less uncertainty from assigning the probabilities with 
the maximum uncertainty such as uniform probabilities to the states of nature based on 
the principle of insufficient reason.  The alternatives with less uncertainty represent the 
unintentionally uninstalled bias in decision making. 
 
4.3 INCONSISTENCY 
The principle of insufficient reason has a drawback in that a probability 
distribution varies with the designation of the states of nature.  Laplace (1814), Luce and 
Raiffa (1957), Box and Tiao (1973), Shafer (1976), Sinn (1980), and Kass and 
Wasserman (1994) pointed out this drawback. 
 
4.3.1 Discrete Variable Case: Partitioning Paradox 
Shafer (1976) provided a simple example about the partitioning paradox.  
Scientists have a question about a life near the star Sirius.  There are two possible states, 
A1 and A2.  Each denotes that a life exists and that no life exists, respectively.  The 
principle of insufficient reason yield ½ on both states.  Then, the scientists refined the 
question on the existence of planets around Sirius.  The states of nature in this question 
consist of three events, P , AP , and PA : P  denotes that a planet does not exist, AP  
denotes that a planet exists but no life, and PA  denotes that a planet exists and a life 
also.  Based on the principle of insufficient reason, those three events have the same 
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probability of ⅓ and the probability of life existing has now decreased from ½ to ⅓ even 
though we have no information in either way of formulating the problem.  A1 is 
equivalent to the event, PA , and A2 is to the two events, AP  and P .  However,  
P(A1)≠P( PA ) and P(A2)≠P( P )+P( AP ).  This inequality is called the partitioning 
paradox. 
The inconsistency may also happen for the uncertainty model in decision making 
problem.  The principle of insufficient reason might provide different probability 
distributions depending on which variable the principle of insufficient reason is applied 
to.  Suppose we have a heterogeneous porous medium, as shown in Figure 4.3.  The 
media consists of two cells and the uncertainty exists in permeabilities of the two cells.  
The effective permeability, keff for this composite medium is defined as a harmonic mean, 
as shown in Equation 4.1.  The permeabilities of two parts, k1 and k2 might be 
considered as the input variables, the harmonic mean as a model, and the effective 
permeability as a response. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Heterogeneous porous medium 
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +=
21eff k
1
k
1
2
1
k
1  (4.1) 
 
k1 k2 
Flow 
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There are two possible applications of the principle of insufficient reason.  In the 
first way, the principle is applied to the input variables.  If there are two possible states 
in permeability, 1 and 2 (md), the resultant joint probability distribution will be two 
dimensional uniform distributions, as shown in Figure 4.4a.  The combinations of k1 and 
k2 make three possible values of the effective permeability, 1, 1.33, and 2 (md).  From 
the joint PMF of k1 and k2, the probabilities of those three states are 0.25, 0.5, and 0.25, 
respectively.  In the second way, the three states might have the same probability when 
the principle of insufficient reason is applied directly to the response variable.  The three 
bins for the effective permeability have the same probability of ⅓, as shown in Figure 
4.4b.  The probability distributions for the effective permeability are different from each 
other.  This inconsistency is summarized in Figure 4.4. 
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(a) Uniform distribution on input variables, k1 and k2 
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(b) Uniform distribution on a response variable, keff 
Figure 4.4 Inconsistent probability distributions caused by the selection of the variable to 
which the principle of insufficient reason is applied 
 
4.3.2 Continuous Variable Case 
The principle of insufficient reason can also result inconsistency for a continuous 
variable space.  If we have a variable, ν  and have no information on the variable, ν  
has a uniform distribution.  Suppose ( )νφ  is a bijective transformation function which 
has a one-to-one correspondence from the sample space of ν  to the sample space of φ .  
Because of the same complete ignorance, the uniform distribution is assigned for φ  
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from the principle of insufficient reason.  The transformation of the continuous 
probability density function (PDF) for φ  provides PDF for ν , but the transformed PDF 
might not be a uniform distribution.  Equations 4.2 through 4.5 show the relationship 
between the original and the transformed PDFs.  The term in Equation 4.5, ν
φ
d
d  is 
called Jacobian of the transformation. 
 
( ) ( ) φφ
φ φ
dfdννf
RR νν ∫∫ ′=′  (4.2)
( ) ( )( ) φφφφ dddννf  dννf 1RR νν −∫∫ ′=′  (4.3)
 
Therefore, 
( ) ( )( ) φφφφφ φφ dddννf   df 1R R φ −∫∫ ′=′  (4.4)
( ) ( ) φφφ d
dν
νff ′=′ or ( ) ( )
dν
dfνf φφφ′=′  (4.5)
 
Table 4.2 shows the various transformation functions and PDFs of the original 
and transformed variables.  The transformation in parameter space may change the 
uniform distribution into the other form.  This inconsistency questions on the 
transformation, that is, a sample space where the principle of insufficient reason should 
be applied to. 
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Table 4.2 Variations of uniform PDF by transformation of a parameter 
Transformation 
Function 
Jacobian PDF ( )φφf  PDF ( )ννf  
( ) ννφ =  1=ν
φ
d
d  
∝ C (constant) 
φ=ν
f(φ)
 
∝ C (constant) 
ν
f(ν)
 
( ) ννφ
1=  2
1
νν
φ =
d
d  
∝ C (constant) 
φ=1/ν
f(φ)
 
∝ 21ν  
f(ν)
ν  
( ) 2ννφ =  νν
φ 2=
d
d  
∝ C (constant) 
φ=ν2
f(φ)
 
∝ ν2  
ν
f(ν)
 
( ) ( )ννφ ln=  νν
φ 1=
d
d  
∝ C (constant) 
φ=ln(ν)
f(φ)
 
∝ ν1  
f(ν)
ν  
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4.4 VIOLATION OF DECISION THEORY 
4.4.1 Axioms in Decision Theory 
Decision theory is a branch of study about choice.  Decision theory includes 
descriptive and normative decision theories that provide how people make a decision and 
what the rational choice is, respectively.  Rational behavior is expressed as a set of 
axioms in Luce and Raiffa (1957).  They used axioms of decision theory in the case of 
complete ignorance to see whether each decision criterion fulfills them.  Luce and 
Raiffa presented eleven axioms as follows.  The nomenclature on axioms is from Milnor 
(1954). 
 
Axiom 1. Ordering: Any decision problem can be resolved. 
Axiom 2. Linearity: The choice set (optimal alternatives) for decision problems 
does not depend upon the choice of origin and unit of utility scale used to abstract 
problem. 
Axiom 3. Symmetry: The choice set is invariant under the labeling of alternatives. 
Axiom 4. Strong domination: If an alternative, A’ belongs to a set of optimal 
alternatives and the other alternative, A’’ has the same with or greater preference 
than A’, A’’ belongs to the set. 
Axiom 5. Strong domination: If A’ belongs to a set of optimal alternatives, A’ is 
preferred to any other alternatives. 
Axiom 6. Special row adjunction: Adding new alternatives, each of which is the 
same preference with some previous alternatives, has no effect on the preference 
in previous alternatives. 
Axiom 7. Row adjunction: The addition of new acts does not transform an old, 
originally non-optimal act into an optimal one, and it can change an old, 
originally optimal act (the most preferred alternative) into a non-optimal one only 
if at least one of the new acts is optimal. 
Axiom 8. Column linearity: Adding a constant utility to each consequence in a 
decision problem does not alter the optimal alternatives. 
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Axiom 9. Convexity: If A’ and A’’ are both optimal for a decision problem, a 
probability mixture of A’ and A’’ is also optimal. 
Axiom 10. Symmetry: For any decision problems in complete ignorance, the 
optimal set should not depend upon the labeling of the state of nature. 
Axiom 11. Column duplication: If a decision problem under uncertainty is 
modified by deleting a column which is equivalent to a probability mixture of 
other columns, then the optimal set (the most preferred alternative) is not altered. 
 
A person may intuitively take some axioms such as Axiom 1 through 4 granted 
because the axioms are reflecting a general (and rational) human behavior.  The human 
behavior is also the basis of decision criteria, for example, maximin, minmax, and 
maximum expected utility.  Milnor (1954) summarized his work on axioms in decision 
theroy and decision criteria with Table 4.3.  Table 4.3 illustrates Luce and Raiffa’s point 
that Axiom 1 through Axiom 9 are compatible to maximum expected utility criterion 
while maximin, minimax, and Hurwicz are eliminated.  Decision making under 
complete ignorance requires satisfying Axiom 10 and Axiom 11. 
 
4.4.2 Violation of Axioms in Decision Theory 
Luce and Raiffa (1957) discussed the state of complete ignorance on the basis of 
the axioms of decision criteria.  They demonstrated that the principle of insufficient 
reason has drawbacks of providing an inconsistent probability distribution and an 
inconsistent optimal alternative for decision making problems under complete ignorance.   
Table 4.4 shows the example similar to the example Luce and Raiffa used to 
illustrate the axiomatic violation with the principle.  In this decision making problem, 
Decision Problem 1 (DP1), a decision maker has two decision alternatives, A1 and A2, 
and two possible states of nature under complete ignorance, S1 and S2.  According to the 
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principle, a decision maker assigns the same probability of ½ to both states of nature.  
These probabilities lead to an expected utility for each alternative, where A1 is preferred 
to A2, as shown in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.3 Axiomatic compatibility of decision criteria (Milnor, 1954) 
Axiom 
Maximum 
Expected Utility 
Maximin Hurwicz Minimax 
1. Ordering ? ? ? ? 
2. Linearity ? ? ? ? 
3. Symmetry  ? ? ? ? 
4 & 5. Strong domination ? ? ? ? 
6. Special row adjunction ? ? ? ? 
7. Row adjunction ? ? ?  
8. Column linearity ?   ? 
9. Convexity ? ?  ? 
11. Column duplication  ? ? ? 
 
The other decision problem, DP2, has the same two alternatives but a different 
number of states of nature.  The additional four states of nature, S3 through S6 have the 
same consequences as with the state, S2.  Through the principle of insufficient reason, 
six states of nature have the same probability, 1/6.  As shown in Table 4.6, A2 is now 
preferred to A1. 
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Table 4.4 Decision matrix for axiomatic approach example 
  States of Nature 
  S1 S2 
Decision A1 11 0 
Alternatives A2 0 10 
 
 
Table 4.5 Decision based on the principle of insufficient reason for Decision Problem 1 
(DP1) 
  States of Nature Expected 
  S1 S2 Utility 
Decision A1 11 0 5.5 
Alternatives A2 0 10 5.0 
Probabilities  2
1
 2
1
  
 
Table 4.6 Decision based on the principle of insufficient reason for Decision Problem 2 
(DP2) 
  States of Nature Expected
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 Utility 
Decision A1 11 0 0 0 0 0 1.8 
Alternatives A2 0 10 10 10 10 10 8.3 
Probabilities  6
1
 6
1
 6
1
 6
1
 6
1
 6
1
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Under complete ignorance, DP1 and DP2 are identical because a decision maker 
does not know what the true state would be.  If states of nature, S2 through S6 are 
lumped into one state S*, probability that S* will occur is equal to the sum of probabilities 
for S2 through S6, 5/6.  For satisfying the axiom, S* in DP2 should have the same 
probability with S2 in DP1.  However, P(S*)|DP2=5/6 and P(S2)|DP1=½.  DP1 and DP2 
are different from each other in principle of insufficient reason in that they have different 
probability distributions and different optimal decisions.  This inconsistency indicates 
that the principle of insufficient reason violates Axiom 11. 
The violation of Axiom 10 can be explained with the same decision example.  
Axiom 10 states that different labeling of states of nature, S2 in DP1 and S* (S2 through 
S6) in DP2 should not change the optimal set.  However, the principle of insufficient 
reason produces different optimal decision, as shown in the example illustrated by Tables 
4.5 and 4.6. 
Axiom 10 alone does not mean that all states of nature are equally likely.  Luce 
and Raiffa argued that the concept of equiprobability is a product of the combination of 
Axiom 10 and the previous seven Axioms (1 through 9 except 2 and 6).  They 
unintentionally put one more constraint on the combination of eight Axioms.  The 
constraint is the indifference in labeling of the states.  The indifference plays an 
important role with the eight Axioms to produce equiprobable states of nature for 
decision making under complete ignorance.  The indifference is not one of the axioms 
mentioned by them.  It should be noted that Axiom 10 focuses on the optimal set, not on 
probabilities on states of nature, the indifference in states of nature, and/or the 
consequences in decision matrix. 
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4.5 EXTENSION OF PRINCIPLE OF INSUFFICIENT REASON 
4.5.1 Entropy-Based Principles for Probability Assessment 
Jaynes (1957) and Tribus (1969) made use of the principle of maximum entropy 
to assess the prior probabilities in Bayes’ theorem.  Their prior probabilities include 
information, which is associated in the form of average and/or variance when maximizing 
entropy.  Jaynes (1957) suggested a principle of maximum entropy (PME) to establish 
the probability distribution on a random variable.  The probability distribution from 
PME is unbiased because the maximization allows maximum uncertainty on the 
probability distribution subjected to a set of mathematical constraints, which is equivalent 
to previous knowledge.  Jaynes argued that PME removes the arbitrariness in assigning 
probability distribution when information is provided as a mathematical form such as 
expected value or variance.  Tribus (1969) showed various cases of probability 
distributions from different states of knowledge.  The states of knowledge were 
formulated by mathematical equations such as the expected value, variance, and expected 
value of lognormal space.  The equations work as constraints on the maximization of 
entropy.  Table 4.7 shows probability distributions from the combinations of the 
formulated states of knowledge.  The resultant PDFs are derived by taking limit on the 
number of discrete bins where the entropy is defined by. 
A generalized version of the principle of maximum entropy is the principle of 
minimum relative entropy.  Relative entropy of the probability density function (PDF), 
q(x), to the PDF, p(x), is defined with Equation 4.6, which is called the Kullback-Leibler 
relative entropy functional (Kullback, 1959).  The PDF, p(x), represents previous 
knowledge and q(x) represents the state of knowledge associated with new information.   
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) dxxp
xq
lnxqpq,H ∫ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=  (4.6)
 
Table 4.7 Maximum entropy probability distributions 
Constraints PDF from PME 
1pi =∑  Uniform distribution 
1p i =∑  
xxp ii =∑  Exponential distribution 
+∞≤≤∞− x  Gaussian distribution 
+∞≤≤ x0  
1p i =∑  
xxp ii =∑  
( ) 2x2ii σxxp =−∑  Finite range of x 
Truncated Gaussian 
distribution 
1p i =∑  
xxp ii =∑  
( ) ( )xlnxlnp ii =∑  
Gamma distribution 
1p i =∑  
( ) ( )xlnxlnp ii =∑  
( ) ( )xxp ii −=−∑ 1ln1ln  
Beta distribution 
 
The principle of minimum relative entropy means that the posterior probability 
distribution, q(x) should be as diffused as the prior probability, p(x), under the 
mathematical constraint from the new information such as expected values or variances.  
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If p(x) is a uniform distribution, the principle of minimum relative entropy is equivalent 
to the principle of maximum entropy. 
The principle of maximum entropy and the principle of minimum relative entropy 
have been used for estimating prior probabilities in many fields.  Baker (1990) applied 
them to uncertain variables of live loads on warehouse floors and friction angle of 
gravelly sand.  Lind et al. (1991) studied the probability distribution for concrete 
strength on the basis of relative entropy.  Woodbury and Ulrych (1993) performed 
Monte Carlo simulations with prior probability distribution for parameters affecting 
groundwater flow.  In all cases, the prior probabilities were assigned by minimum 
relative entropy. 
 
4.5.2 Invariance-Based Principle for Probability Assessment 
Jeffreys (1946, 1961) and Box and Tiao (1973) introduced the concept of 
invariance to assess prior probabilities based on the principle of insufficient reason.  
Both of them suggested the way to have a single sample space where the principle of 
insufficient reason should be applied to.  The basis of Jeffreys’ rule is the discrepancy of 
a non-informative probability distribution in power transformation of sample space (Kass 
and Wasserman, 1994).  Box and Tiao (1973) suggested the other method to establish a 
sample space for a non-informative prior probability distribution.  Their fundamental 
concept to define the sample space is “data-translated likelihood”, which means the 
invariance of the degree of uncertainty in any information.  The notion indicates that 
various likelihood functions for any information have the same shape and different 
location in the sample space.  Once the sample space is determined by the concept of 
data-translated likelihood, the uniform distribution is assigned based on the principle of 
insufficient reason. 
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Although the notions of Jeffreys and Box and Tiao, invariance, are essential to 
assess non-informative prior probabilities, the methods they suggested still require 
information.  The information includes the probability models, such as Gaussian or 
logarithmic probability density function to qualify the invariance, Stieltjes discrepancy in 
Jeffreys’ rule, and likelihood function in Box and Tiao’s data-translated likelihood. 
 
4.5.3 Limitations of the Entropy-Based and Invariance-Based Principles 
Both of the groups, entropy-based camp and invariance-based camp, elaborated 
the methods to establish a sample space for non-informative prior probabilities.  A 
unique sample space defined by them brings consistent non-informative prior 
probabilities.  However, the non-informative prior probabilities are still subjected to the 
conclusion in Journel and Deutsch (1993), the maximum uncertainty in input variables 
may not guarantee the maximum uncertainty in responses.  Therefore, the non-
informative prior probabilities still based on the principle of maximum entropy applied to 
a sample space may not yield the decision alternatives under the maximum entropy.  
Furthermore, the both groups’ methods are also based on some information, which may 
mislead the decision under the state of complete ignorance. 
 
4.6 SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES 
Based on three difficulties with the principle of insufficient reason, many well-
known and reputed decision theorists, including Savage, Luce and Raiffa, Jaynes, etc, 
believe that theoretical difficulties with the principle are not relevant because there is 
always some subjective information to be used in assessing probabilities.  They 
therefore defined the prior probabilities in applying Bayes’ theorem (Equation 2.1) by 
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including subjective information.  The problem with this approach is that it is not 
defensible and does not provide a consistent starting point.  Furthermore, in a 
complicated engineering problem where there are numerous states of nature, a 
tremendous amount of subjective information is required just to get started. 
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Chapter 5. Proposed Method: Decision-Based Non-Informative Prior 
Probabilities 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins by proposing a definition of an unbiased starting point for 
decision making under complete ignorance.  Based on this starting point, the basis of the 
decision-based method for non-informative prior probabilities will be developed, and a 
comparison will be made with the principle of insufficient reason.  A detailed algorithm 
for implementation of the decision-based method in practice will be presented at the end 
of this chapter. 
 
5.2 UNBIASED STARTING POINT 
The decision-based method is based on the fact that decision making under 
complete ignorance should be unbiased.  In this section, the basis of the decision-based 
method and supporting argument for the concept will be provided.  The basis of the 
decision-based method is about how the method is developed from the axioms of 
decision theory, and how the method provides an unbiased starting point for decision 
making.  The supporting argument will show a connection between the decision-based 
method and the conventional concept of random choice. 
 
5.2.1 Basis of Decision-Based Method 
The basis of the sample space for a decision making under complete ignorance 
can be provided by the axioms in decision theory, Axiom 10 and Axiom 11.  Those 
axioms characterize the state of complete ignorance and states that the labeling of the 
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states of nature (the sample space) does not affect, and that adding repeated columns in 
decision matrix does not affect the non-informative prior probabilities.  Those two 
axioms require the decision making problems with two decision alternatives in Figure 5.1 
identical each other.  When adding a new column (S4 in Decision 2), the number of 
states of nature changes from 3 to 4, but there is no change in the number of preference 
outcomes.  There are three possibilities of preference outcomes in Decision 1.  In 
Decision 1, A1 is preferred to A2 at the state, S1, A2 is preferred to A1 at S2, and A1 and 
A2 has the same preference at S3.  In Decision 2, the state, S4, provides the same 
preference outcome with the state, S3, and the set of preference outcomes does not 
change. 
  
  States of Nature
  S2 S2 S3 
Decision A1 2 0 1 
Alternatives A2 0 1 1  
   States of Nature 
  S2 S2 S3 S4 
Decision A1 2 0 1 1 
Alternatives A2 0 1 1 1  
(a) Decision 1  (b) Decision 2 
Figure 5.1 Decision matrices for illustrating the basis of decision-based method 
 
The sample space of preference outcome, which is implied by Axiom 10 and 
Axiom 11, provides another benefit: it consists of mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive set of events.  The preference outcomes between two decision alternatives 
can be classified into three possibilities: A1 is preferred to A2, A2 is preferred to A1, and 
A1 and A2 has the same preference: 
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A1>A2 
A1<A2 
A1~A2 
where “>” and “<” denotes dominance of one alternative to the others and “~” denotes 
the indifference between decision alternatives.  These three preference outcome describe 
all possibilities in decision making and there is no overlap in the preference relationship. 
The mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events provide an appropriate 
sample space to Bernoulli’s principle of insufficient reason.  The principle assigns the 
same probabilities to the sample space consists of preference outcomes and makes a 
decision making under complete ignorance unbiased.  The resultant non-informative 
prior probabilities are based on the preference in all decision alternatives.  This is why 
the proposed method is called a decision-based method. 
A decision-based method can be extended to decision making with n decision 
alternatives.  All possible preference outcomes for the decision making, which are 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, are as follows: 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
−
n21
321
n1n
31
21
n
2
1
A~~A~A
A~A~A
A~A
A~A
A~A
A
A
A
K
M
M
M
M
 
 53
Regardless of what the sample space is, it can be divided into these preference outcomes.  
The preference outcomes are discriminated by focusing on which decision alternative(s) 
is the most preferred.  For example, the preference outcome, “A1>” is distinguished 
from the preference outcome, “A1~A2>” because the first preference outcome represents 
the event that A1 is the only best decision alternative, and the second one represents the 
event that both A1 and A2 are the most preferred to the others.  The principle of 
insufficient reason is applied to the set of preference outcomes and all preference 
outcomes are equally likely.  The probability is equal to the inverse of the total number 
of preference outcomes as in Equation 5.1. 
 
( )
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1
CCC
1outcomepreferencep n
nn2n1n −
=+++= L          (5.1)
 
     The resultant non-informative probabilities also make individual decision 
alternative equally likely.  The event that Ai is the best decision includes all preference 
outcomes including Ai as one of the best alternatives, such as “A1>”, “A1~A2>” and “A1~ 
A2~ …~An>”.  In this manner, the probabilities that Ai is the best for all i (i=1, 2, …,n) 
are all equal and the probability is equal to 2(1-n).  The probabilities for the states of 
nature can be calculated by making all possible consequences for preferred alternative 
equally likely in a given preference outcome. 
 
5.2.2 Complete Ignorance and Random Choice 
Decision making under complete ignorance is called random choice.  The 
principle of insufficient reason uses the concept of random choice by assigning the same 
probabilities to state of nature.  It is an intuitive and understandable idea, but it may 
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produce inconsistency and unreasonable probabilities, as shown in the previous chapter.  
Strictly speaking, the random choice in the application of the principle of insufficient 
reason is the choice with random states of nature.  The decision-based method agrees 
with the idea that decision making under complete ignorance is random choice, but has a 
different interpretation of the concept of random choice.  In this study, a random choice 
literally means a random choice.  The randomness should go to a decision maker’s 
choice, in other words, decision alternatives rather than to nature’s choice (that is, states 
of nature).  This interpretation is supported by Cohen and Jaffray (1980).  They noted 
about the rational behavior under complete ignorance: 
 
“…since the decision maker has no special affection for any particular state of 
nature, the identities of the states of nature on which two given acts yield, 
respectively, such and such outcome have no effect on his preference between 
those acts.” 
 
Suppose a decision maker is playing a coin-flipping game.  If a decision maker’s 
guess is right, the reward would be 10 utilities and otherwise, -10 utilities.  Based on the 
principle of insufficient reason, a decision maker assigns ½ to two states of nature: head 
(H) or tail (T) because there are two states of nature and because the randomness makes 
the probabilities, P(H) and P(T) equal to each other.  The decision-based method also 
assigns the same probabilities to the two states of nature.  However, the reason for 
assigning the same probabilities in the decision-based method is different from the one 
for the principle of insufficient reason.  The decision-based method sees this decision 
making problem with newly decided two events with the same probabilities: an event that 
betting on H is preferred to betting on T and the other event for the opposite.  The first 
case corresponds to the state, H and the second to the event, T.  The probabilities on two 
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states of nature are the same for the principle of insufficient reason and the decision-
based method.   
In fact, the ways used for the principle of insufficient reason implicates the 
decision-based method in this coin-flipping example.  If a person thinks that the 
decision making under complete ignorance is based on the random states of nature, the 
states of nature would involved in uncertain factors in the game rather than the outcome 
of the game.  For example, the uncertain factor might be the probability that the coin 
shows a head.  Because there is no reason to believe that the coin is fair and no 
specification on the probability, it would be more reasonable for a conventional decision 
maker to assign the same probabilities to the sample space defined by P(H).  However, 
what people do is different from the random state of nature.  People set a sample space 
having the events, H and T rather than P(H) or P(T).  The states of nature, H and T used 
in the principle of insufficient reason might be the sample space which a rational person 
under complete ignorance set unconsciously.  The sample space with H and T is based 
on the preference in decision alternative and this is what the decision-based method does.  
This supports the statement that the decision-based method is valid because a rational 
person treats a decision making problem under complete ignorance as a random choice.  
The rational person may intuitively realize that the decision making under complete 
ignorance is a random choice and set up the sample space as above.   
The fundamental idea of the decision-based method is that a starting point for 
decision making should be neutral to decision alternatives.  The decision with these 
balanced alternatives is called an unbiased decision.  This equality in the preference 
between decision alternatives turns decision making under complete ignorance into a 
random choice. 
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5.2.3 Random Choice and Sample Space 
The new interpretation of the random choice can be implemented by manipulating 
states of nature to have a new sample space.  In fact, the appropriate sample space has 
been a critical issue since Laplace.  Laplace’s equipossibility and equiprobability, 
Jeffreys’ invariance, Box and Tiao’s data translated likelihood are good examples for the 
efforts to make the rational non-informative probability distribution by defining a sample 
space.  While the principle of insufficient reason focuses only on states of nature, the 
decision-based method extends the focus to a whole decision framework.  The decision-
based method has a modified interpretation of the uncertainty in decision making 
problem, as shown in Equation 5.2.  The information in Equation 5.2 represents all 
available information given to a decision maker.  P(Si|Sample Space) becomes a non-
informative prior probability distribution.  The decision-based method makes use of 
decision frameworks to provide an appropriate sample space and non-informative 
probabilities.  In the decision-based method, the sample space in Equation 5.2 is defined 
by preference outcomes from each state of nature.  The preference outcomes are set to 
have balanced probabilities on the basis of random choice.   
 ( )
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The idea of manipulating the sample space by preference outcomes comes from 
scenario-based planning.  In scenario-based planning, a probability distribution is 
discarded and an uncertainty is reduced to “a few scenarios whose differences make a 
difference to decision-makers” (Schwartz, 1991) or to “a small set of fundamentally 
different paths into the future” (Lempert et al., 2006).  Based on this concept of 
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scenario-based approach, Lempert et al. developed a robust decision making (RDM) 
method for deep uncertainty, which is equivalent to complete ignorance.  The method 
reduces a large number of states of nature into two new states: a state where a certain 
alternative is preferred and the other state where the alternative is not preferred.  
However, RDM may not provide consistent result in the two states when the decision is 
made under three or more decision alternatives.  In addition, as mentioned in their study, 
RDM does not determine the best decision alternative; it is intended to help a decision 
maker to compare the behavior of each alternative. 
In the viewpoint of a decision maker, the scenario-based approach provides new 
states of nature, which is extensively simplified from the original sample space and the 
new states of nature also requires probabilities.  Although the scenario-based approach 
is not complete in that the method does not have a criterion on identifying a single 
optimal alternative, the idea is one of the motivations of this research.  The first lesson 
from the scenario-based approach is that the states of nature can be transformed into new 
states of nature.  The second lesson is that the new states of nature are selected by their 
impact or importance on decision alternatives (in other words, the consequences in 
decision matrix). 
In the previous decision example in Section 4.2 (Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1), States 
1 and 2 have the preference in decision alternatives, Alternative A>Alternative B 
(Alternative A is preferred to Alternative B), and State 3 has Alternative A<Alternative 
B.  The original sample space (States 1, 2, and 3) turns into the new sample space of two 
preference outcomes, as shown in Figure 5.2.  For non-biased decision under complete 
ignorance, P(Alternative A>Alternative B) should be equal to P(Alternative 
A<Alternative B).  These equal probabilities mean that the principle of insufficient 
reason or its modern version of the principle of maximum entropy (PME) is applied to 
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the new sample space: Event 1, (Alternative A>Alternative B) and Event 2, (Alternative 
A<Alternative B).  The probability for each state in the new sample space is ½, as 
shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Concept of the decision-based method: modification in sample space 
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Figure 5.3 Unbiased starting point for decision making 
 
For decision analysis, a probability distribution on the original sample space is 
required.  The PME can be used again for this conversion of the non-biased probability 
distribution into the original states of nature.  The previous application of the principle 
State 1 
State 3 
State 2 
Alternative A > Alternative B 
Alternative A < Alternative B 
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of insufficient reason provides a set of constraints on the sample space transformation.  
The constraints are built from the relationship between the original states of nature and 
preference outcome space.  Each preference outcome has corresponding state of nature.  
Event 1 (Alternative A>Alternative B) corresponds to States 1 and 2 and Event 2 
(Alternative A<Alternative B) to State 3.  In mathematical expression, P(Event 
1)=P(S1)+P(S2) and P(Event 2)=P(S3).  Therefore, the optimization by PME is the 
maximizing the function, H, defined in Equation 5.3 subjected to the constraints, 
Equations 5.4 and 5.5. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ })P(S)lnP(S)P(S)lnP(S)P(S)lnP(SH 332211 ++−=  (5.3) 
2
1)P(S)P(S 21 =+  (5.4) 
2
1)P(S3 =  (5.5) 
 
Applying the principle of insufficient reason (or the principle of maximum 
entropy) with these constraints yield the same probabilities for S1 and S2.  The resultant 
non-informative prior probability distribution for the simple example is shown in Figure 
5.4.  Although the non-informative probabilities in Figure 5.4 are not uniform, the PMF 
indicates the same preference in two decision alternatives.  This means that the PMF in 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 represents an unbiased starting point for the simple decision making 
example. 
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Figure 5.4 Non-informative prior probability distribution for simple decision example 
 
5.3 ALGORITHM FOR DECISION-BASED METHOD 
In the previous section, the decision-based method based on the unbiased starting 
point was shown with a simple example.  The detailed algorithm for the decision-based 
method will be explained in this section with a larger decision matrix.  The algorithm 
for the decision-based method is implemented with a Visual Basic code in the form of a 
module.  The form provides a flexible way to be coupled with decision making 
applications.  The algorithm code is attached in Appendix B. 
Suppose we have a decision making problem with no information, as shown in 
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.5.  The first task of the decision-based method is to build a set of 
preference outcomes from each state of nature in the decision matrix.  There are four 
possible preference outcomes: 
1. A1>: A1 is the only most preferred decision alternative 
2. A2>: A2 is the only most preferred decision alternative 
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3. A3>: A3 is the only most preferred decision alternative 
4. A1~A2>: Both A1 and A2 are the most preferred decision alternative 
The first preference outcome is from the state, S1, the second preference outcome from 
the state, S2, the third from the state, S7, and the fourth from the states, S3 through S6.  
The second task is to apply Bernoulli’s principle of insufficient reason to the preference 
outcomes.  Each of four preference outcomes takes the probability of ¼, as shown in 
Figure 5.6, and this represents the unbiased starting point for decision making.  The 
third task is to convert the probabilities assigned to preference outcomes to probabilities 
on the original states of nature, S1 through S7.  Each of the states of nature, S1, S2, and S7 
is the only state corresponding to each preference outcome.  These relationships 
between preference outcomes and states of nature are expressed in Equations, 5.6 through 
5.8.  
 
P(S1)=P(A1>)=¼ (5.6) 
P(S2)=P(A2>)=¼ (5.7) 
P(S7)=P(A3>)=¼ (5.8) 
 
The four states of nature, S3 through S6 have the same preference outcome, A1~A2>. 
 
P(S3)+P(S4)+P(S5)+P(S6)=P(A1~A2>)=¼ (5.9) 
 
The rest four states of nature, S3 through S6 are discriminated with the consequence of the 
most preferred decision alternative.  The state, S6 has a utility of 8 for A2 while the 
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states, S3, S4, and S5 have 10.  These two subsets should have the same probabilities of 
1/8. 
P(S3)+P(S4)+P(S5)=P(S6)=1/8 (5.10) 
 
From the notion of the complete ignorance expressed with Axiom 10 and Axiom 11, the 
sum of non-informative probabilities for S3 and S4 should be equal to the probability for 
S5. 
P(S3)+P(S4)=P(S5)=1/16 (5.11) 
 
The principle of insufficient reason is again applied to have the unknown probabilities, 
P(S3) and P(S4) with the mathematical constraint given in Equation 5.11.  Therefore, the 
probabilities for S3 and S4 are equal to 1/32.  The resultant non-informative prior 
probabilities for the states of nature are shown in Figure 5.7.   
 
Table 5.1 Decision matrix for a decision making example with three decision alternatives 
 States of Nature 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 
Expected  
Utility 
A1 11 10 0 0 0 0 0 5.25 
A2 0 10 10 10 10 8 1 5 
Decision 
Alternatives 
A3 9 9 7 7 5 2 2 6 
Probabilities  4
1  
4
1  
32
1  
32
1  
16
1  
8
1  
4
1   
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Figure 5.5 Decision tree for a decision making example with three decision alternatives 
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Figure 5.6 Non-informative prior probabilities assigned to preference outcomes 
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Figure 5.7 Non-informative prior probabilities assigned to states of nature 
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Chapter 6. Evaluation and of Decision-Based Method for Non-
Informative Prior Probabilities 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
A detailed discussion on the decision-based method will be given.  The objective 
of this chapter is to evaluate the merits of the proposed decision-based method for non-
informative prior probabilities (decision-based priors).  The decision-based method will 
be evaluated according to the following three questions: 1) does the decision-based 
method produce rational and reasonable results?, 2) can the decision-based method be 
applied consistently and practically so that a decision maker always gets the same starting 
point for the same problems?, and 3) does the decision-based method satisfy axioms of 
decision theory?  In addition, the practical implications of this proposed approach will 
be explored. 
 
6.2 EVALUATION OF DECISION-BASED PRIORS 
The principle of insufficient reason for establishing non-informative prior 
probability distribution has three practical difficulties.  It provides an unbiased starting 
point for decision making, it does not lead to consistent results, and it violates reasonable 
axioms of decision theory. 
 
6.2.1 Unbiasedness 
The underlying principle of decision-based priors is to make all possible 
outcomes of decision preference equally likely.  Therefore, it is designed specifically to 
produce unbiasedness in the decision alternatives.  The previous example in Table 4.1, 
Figure 4.1, and Figure 5.3 can illustrate the unbiasedness, as shown in Table 6.1 and 
 66
Figure 6.1.  While the principle of insufficient reason assigns different probabilities to 
each preference outcomes (Figure 6.1a), the decision-based method results in the equally 
likely preference outcomes (Figure 6.1b). 
 
Table 6.1 Decision matrix for illustrating unbiasedness of the decision-based method 
  States of Nature 
  State 1 State 2 State 3 
Alternative A 0 1 2 Decision 
Alternative Alternative B 3 2 0 
Principle of  
insufficient  
reason 
⅓ ⅓ ⅓ 
Probabilities Decision 
-based  
method 
¼ ¼ ½ 
Preference Outcome 
Alternative A< 
Alternative B 
Alternative A< 
Alternative B 
Alternative A> 
Alternative B 
 
0
0.5
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Probability
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1
3
2
3
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2
(a) Principle of insufficient reason (b) Decision-based method 
Figure 6.1 Unbiasedness in decision-based method 
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6.2.2 Consistency 
The method to establish decision-based prior probabilities provides a consistent 
set of probabilities for the states of nature because it relies solely on how the states affect 
the decision consequences and not how the states themselves are defined.  Therefore, for 
the same decision making problem (that is, the same set of alternatives and possible 
consequences for each alternative), consistent probabilities will be obtained for the 
possible consequences regardless of how the associated states are labeled or defined. 
The consistency in decision-based priors can be illustrated with the heterogeneous 
porous media example in Section 4.3.1.  A decision framework is assigned to the 
heterogeneous porous media example, as shown in Table 6.2.  In this decision matrix, 
two preference outcomes are possible, as shown in Figure 6.1.  The decision-based 
method assigns probabilities to two different sample spaces on states of nature, as shown 
in Figure 6.2.  The non-informative probabilities given in forms of bivariate k (Figure 
6.2 (a) left) can be transformed into the sample space of keff (Figure 6.2 (a) right).  
Therefore, whether k1 and k2 or keff are used to define the states of nature, the same result 
is obtained 
There are tow possible preference outcomes, A1>A2 for the state, S1 and A1<A2 
for the states, S2 through S4.  The decision-based method assigns the same probabilities 
to those two preference outcome: 
P(A1>A2)= ½ 
P(A1<A2)= ½ 
Because the state, S1 is the only state which has the preference outcome, A1>A2 and the 
states, S2 through S4 have the preference outcome, A1<A2, 
P(S1)= P(A1>A2)= ½ 
P(S2)+P(S3)+P(S4)= P(A1<A2)= ½ 
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Based on the axioms in decision theory regarding a decision making under complete 
ignorance, the states, S2 and S3 (the repeated columns), could be treated as a divided 
states from the lumped state, S*, and they are equally likely. 
 S*={S2, S3} 
 P(S2)=P(S3) 
The principle of insufficient reason is applied to the states of nature, S* and S4, with the 
same preference outcome.  The application of the principle is subjected to mathematical 
constraint on the summation of probabilities equal to ½.  The results are: 
 P(S*)=P(S4)= ¼ 
 P(S2)=P(S3)= ⅛ 
These decision-based priors are shown in Figure 6.2.   
  
Table 6.2 Decision matrix for the heterogeneous porous media example 
   State of Nature  
  S1 S2 S3 S4 
  [k1,k2]=[1,1] [k1,k2]=[1,2] [k1,k2]=[2,1] [k1,k2]=[2,2] 
  keff=1 keff=1.33 keff=1.33 keff=2 
Decision A1 10 5 5 2 
Alternatives A2 2 7 7 7 
Preference Outcome A1>A2 A1<A2 A1<A2 A1<A2 
Probability ½ ⅛ ⅛ ¼ 
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(a) Uniform distribution on input variables, k1 and k2 
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(b) Uniform distribution on a response variable, keff 
Figure 6.2 Consistent non-informative prior probabilities for heterogeneous porous media 
example by the decision-based method 
 
6.2.3 Satisfaction of Axioms in Decision Theory 
The method for decision-based priors satisfies two axioms in decision theory for 
complete ignorance proposed by Luce and Raiffa (1957): 
Axiom 10. Symmetry: For any decision problems [sic] in complete ignorance, the 
optimal set should not depend upon the labeling of the state of nature. 
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Axiom 11. Column duplication: If a decision problem under uncertainty is 
modified by deleting a column which is equivalent to a probability mixture of 
other columns, then the optimal set (the most preferred alternative) is not altered. 
The same examples used to show axiomatic violations of the principle of insufficient 
reason will be used to compare the decision-based method and the principle of 
insufficient reason. 
The method of decision-based priors satisfied Axiom 11 because duplicate 
columns provide the same consequences, which are treated as equally likely possibilities.  
Therefore, the contribution of uncertainty in this consequence remains the same no matter 
how many different states of nature produce it. 
To illustrate Axiom 11, decision making problems, DP1 and DP2 in Tables 4.5 
and 4.6, respectively have the same preferred decision.  The resultant probability 
distributions from the decision-based method can be obtained with the preference 
outcomes shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4.  Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are non-informative PMFs 
for both decision making problems.  For DP1, both the principle of insufficient reason 
and the method for decision-based priors have the same probability distribution, but for 
DP2, the probability distribution is different from each other, as shown in Table 6.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Preference outcomes for Decision Problem 1 (DP1) 
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Figure 6.4 Preference outcomes for Decision Problem 2 (DP2) 
Table 6.3 Decision based on probabilities from the decision-based method for Decision 
Problem 1 (DP1) 
  States of Nature Expected 
  S1 S2 Utility 
Decision A1 11 0 5.5 
Alternatives A2 0 10 5.0 
Probabilities  2
1
 2
1
  
 
Table 6.4 Decision based on probabilities from the decision-based method for Decision 
Problem 2 (DP2) 
  States of Nature Expected
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 Utility 
Decision A1 11 0 0 0 0 0 5.5 
Alternatives A2 0 10 10 10 10 10 5.0 
Probabilities  2
1  
10
1  
10
1
10
1
10
1
10
1
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Table 6.5 Probability distributions under complete ignorance for DP1 and DP2 by the 
principle of insufficient reason and the decision-based method 
 Decision Problem 1 Decision Problem 2 
Principle of 
Insufficient 
Reason   
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
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1
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2
1
 State
S1 S2
6
1
S3 S4 S5 S6
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
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Decision-
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2
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 State
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2
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While the principle of insufficient reason provides two different optimal decision 
alternatives on two decision making problems (A1 for DP1 and A2 for DP2), the decision-
based method provides the same optimal decision alternative for both decision 
alternatives in DP1 and DP2 (Table 6.6).  The expected utility for A1 is 5.5 and that for 
A2 is 5.0 for DP1 and DP2.  The decision-based method therefore satisfies Luce and 
Raiffa’s concept on complete ignorance in decision making: S2 in DP1 is equivalent to S2 
through S6 in DP2 for a decision maker. 
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Axiom 10 requires consistency in the prior probabilities, regardless of how the 
states in the sample space are defined.  As derives in Section 6.2.2, the method of 
decision-based priors provides consistency and satisfies Axiom 10. 
The satisfaction of Axiom 10 can be illustrated with heterogeneous porous media 
example shown in Figure 4.3.  The uncertain variable in the example can be expressed 
with individual permeabilities, k1 and k2 or with effective permeability, keff.  These two 
ways to label the uncertain variable caused inconsistency in non-informative 
probabilities, as shown in Figure 4.4, and the change in the optimal decision, as shown in 
Table 6.7 for the principle of insufficient reason.  However, the decision-based method 
provides the same non-informative probabilities, expected utilities, and the optimal 
decision. 
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Table 6.6 Comparison of axiomatic satisfaction (Axiom 11) between the principle of 
insufficient reason and decision-based methods 
 The Principle of Insufficient Reason Decision-Based Method 
E(A1)=5.5 
E(A2)=5.0 
A1 is optimal 
E(A1)=5.5 
E(A2)=5.0 
A2 is optimal 
Decision 
Problem  
1 P(S1)=0.5 
P(S2)=0.5 
P(S1)=0.5 
P(S2)=0.5 
E(A1)=1.8 
E(A2)=8.3 
A2 is optimal 
E(A1)=5.5 
E(A2)=5.0 
A1 is optimal 
Decision 
Problem  
2 
P(S1)=0.16 
P(S2)+P(S3)+P(S4)+P(S5)+P(S6)=0.84 
P(S1)=0.5 
P(S2)+P(S3)+P(S4)+P(S5)+P(S6)=0.5 
DP1 and 
DP2 have 
- Difference decisions 
- Incompatible probabilities 
 P(S2) ≠P(S2)+P(S3)+P(S4)+P(S5)+P(S6) 
- Same decisions 
- Compatible probabilities 
P(S2)=P(S2)+P(S3)+P(S4)+P(S5)+P(S6)
DP1 and 
DP2 are 
Not identical Identical 
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Table 6.7 Decision analysis results for both sample spaces of heterogeneous porous 
media example 
Sample Space 
The Principle of Insufficient 
Reason 
Decision-Based Method 
[k1,k2], 4 Bins 
Expected utility for A1=5.5 
Expected utility for A2=5.75 
Optimal decision: A2 
Expected utility for A1=4.75 
Expected utility for A2=5.75 
Optimal decision: A2 
[keff], 3 Bins 
Expected utility for A1=5.67 
Expected utility for A2=5.33 
Optimal decision: A1 
Expected utility for A1=4.75 
Expected utility for A2=5.75 
Optimal decision: A2 
 
 76
6.3 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION-BASED PRIORS 
6.3.1 Scope of the Method for Decision-Based Priors 
The method for decision-based priors is based on the context of a decision.  The 
method is therefore not applicable to a probability assessment problem without a decision 
framework.  For example, the proposed approach is not applicable for calculating the 
probability of failure of an offshore structure system, the probability that the oil price 
increases, the probability that a 6.0-magnitude earthquake strikes the nuclear facility, and 
so on.  However, the point of assessing probability is ultimately to support decision 
making, so that limitation is not significant.  In fact, it is telling that probabilities need a 
decision framework to have any meaning. 
 
6.3.2 Change in Non-Informative Probabilities with Different Decision Frameworks 
The method for decision-based priors requires a decision matrix for a decision 
making problem as an input, and accordingly may be influenced by a change in decision.  
Non-informative prior probabilities for different decision making problems may be 
different from each other, even in the case of decision making problems with the same 
states of nature.  The different non-informative probabilities are due to different 
decision alternatives or to different consequences. 
Suppose we have two different decision making problems, as shown in Tables 6.8 
and 6.9.  Those two decision making problems have the same set of states of nature - S1, 
S2, and S3 - but different decision alternatives.  The proposed method to assign decision-
based prior probability, shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, yields two different non-
informative prior probabilities, as shown in Figure 6.7.  The only difference between 
DP3 and DP4 is one additional decision alternative in DP4.  Adding A3 changes the 
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structure of preference outcomes, the non-informative probabilities, expected utilities, 
and the optimal decisions.  DP3 has A1 as an optimal decision because the expected 
utilities for A1 and A2 are 5.5 and 5, respectively.  DP4 has A2 as an optimal decision 
because expected utilities for A1, A2, and A3 are 3.67, 6.67, and 6, respectively.  This 
does not mean that the decision-based method violates Axiom 7 in decision theory (see 
Section 4.4.1) because by changing decision we have changed the sample space for the 
possible states of nature.  The decision criterion based on maximum expected utility 
satisfies Axiom 7 when the same sample space is used in both decision making problems.   
 
Table 6.8 Decision matrix for Decision Problem 3 (DP3) 
  States of Nature 
  S1 S2 S3 
A1 11 0 0 Decision 
Alternatives A2 0 10 10 
 
Table 6.9 Decision matrix for Decision Problem 4 (DP4) 
  States of Nature 
  S1 S2 S3 
A1 11 0 0 
A2 0 10 10 
Decision 
Alternatives 
A3 3 12 3 
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Figure 6.5 Preference outcomes for Decision Problem 3 (DP3) 
 
Figure 6.6 Preference outcomes for Decision Problem 4 (DP4) 
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Figure 6.7 Decision-based non-informative prior probabilities for DP3 and DP4 
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6.3.3 Non-Informative Probabilities and Decision with Information 
Any additional information can be incorporated in a decision making problem 
through Bayes’ theorem, shown in Section 2.3.  The available information is expressed 
as a likelihood function that relates the probabilities of having obtained the information 
for each possible state of nature.  The non-informative prior probabilities from the 
method of decision-based priors and the likelihood function are associated through 
Bayes’ theorem, and the resultant posterior probabilities go to a decision making problem 
with information, as shown in Figure 6.8. 
The method of decision-based priors is advantageous, specifically in practical 
decision making with information, in that the method can reduce the subjectivity.  In 
practical decision making, the information is usually vague because of heterogeneity in 
population, sparsity of data, and error in measurement.  Because it is difficult to 
formulate decision making problems, it is common to make mathematical assumptions 
(e.g. Gaussianity or mathematically convenient probability density function) in order to 
establish a starting point for decision making.  The method of decision-based priors 
provides an unbiased and consistent starting point for decision making without making 
subjective assumptions. 
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Figure 6.8 Schematic diagram for incorporation of information through a Bayesian 
framework 
 
6.3.4 Non-Informative Probability Densities for Continuous Sample Space 
The decision-based method can be extended to decision-making problems with a 
continuous sample space for the state of nature.  The algorithm for the decision-based 
method is basically the same for both continuous and discrete sample spaces.  Suppose 
we have a decision making problem with complete ignorance characterized by utility 
functions, as shown in Figure 6.9.  The continuous random variable representing the 
state of nature ranges between 0 and 6, and there are two decision alternatives called 
Alternative 1 and Alternative 2.  For 0<x<4.34, Alternative 1 is preferred to Alternative 
2, and for 4.34<x<6, Alternative 2 is preferred to Alternative 1.  In a discrete sample 
space, the discrete sample space of ∆x represented by each bin is considered to have the 
same utility.  In other words, the intervals are discretized by utility (y-axis) rather than 
the state of nature, x (x-axis), as shown in Figures 6.10 and 6.11.  The discretized x, Δx, 
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might not be equally discretized as demonstrated by different Δxi when the utility 
function is non-linear. 
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Figure 6.9 Utility functions for two decision alternatives with a sample space defined by 
a random variable, x 
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Figure 6.10 Discretized continuous sample space where Alternative 1 is preferred to 
Alternative 2 
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Figure 6.11 Discretized continuous sample space where Alternative 2 is preferred to 
Alternative 1 
 
The physical basis of this method of discretization is that a decision maker could 
not distinguish two states of nature, x and x+∆x, giving close consequences such as u(x) 
and u(x+∆x).  If ∆u goes to zero, this interpretation produces a non-informative 
probability density function proportional to |du/dx|. 
This non-informative probability density function yields a consistent result for 
any transformation of the random variable, x.  Consider a different labeling for the states 
of nature, y, where y=g(x).  The non-informative prior probability density function for x 
and y within each possible decision preference would be found as follows.* 
 
 
* Note: This derivation assumes that u is a monotonic function of x and y.  It could 
readily be extended to more complicated utility functions. 
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( )
dx
duxf X ∝  (6.1)
( )
dy
duyfY ∝  (6.2)
 
Hence, the non-informative prior density function, fX(x)dx and fY(y)dy are 
proportional to one another whether x or y is used to define the states of nature.  If x is 
used to establish a non-informative prior PDF and then transformed to be in terms of y, 
 
( ) ( )
dy
dxxfyf XY ∝  (6.3)
 
Conversely, if y is used directly to establish a non-informative prior PDF, 
 
( )
( )
dy
dxxf
dxdy
dxdu
dy
duyf
X
Y
∝∝
∝
/
/
 (6.4)
 
Therefore, the same PDF for y is obtained either way and consistency (or invariance) is 
satisfied. 
For the algorithm of the decision-based method, the non-informative PDF for the 
uncertain variable x is shown in Figure 6.12.  A given decision matrix (Figure 6.9) 
provides two possible preference outcomes: Alternative 1 is preferred to Alternative 2, 
and Alternative 2 is preferred to Alternative 1.  The same probabilities are assigned to 
those preference outcomes: 
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P(Alternative 1>Alternative 2)=½ 
P(Alternative 1<Alternative 2)=½ 
Because each preference outcome corresponds to the range of random variable, x, the 
assigned probabilities can be expressed with the range: 
P(0<x<4.34)=½ 
P(4.34<x<6)=½ 
For the range, 0<x<4.34, where Alternative 1 is preferred to Alternative 2, the non-
informative PDF is established by Equation 6.1 with the utility function for Alternative 1.  
For the other range, 4.34<x<6, the utility function in Equation 6.1 is set to be the utility 
function for Alternative 2, which is preferred to Alternative 1 in the range.  The 
resultant non-informative PDF is shown in Figure 6.12.   
There is a drop at x=4.34 because the preference outcomes on the left and right 
are different from each other.  Each of P(0<X<4.34) and P(4.34<X<6) has the 
probability of ½.  The logarithmic transformation function, f(x)=ln(X) yields the non-
informative prior PDF, as shown in Figure 6.13. 
If a decision maker starts with a different sample space, y, the decision matrix is 
illustrated with Figure 6.14.  The non-informative prior PDF for y is shown in Figure 
6.15.  Because y is set as a function of x, y=ln(x), the PDF in Figure 6.15 is identical to 
Figure 6.13.  This example illustrates the consistency in non-informative PDFs obtained 
from the proposed method. 
 85
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Random variable, x
P(x)
 
Figure 6.12 Non-informative prior probability density function for x 
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Figure 6.13 Non-informative prior probability dendsity function for the transformed 
sample space, ln(x) 
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Figure 6.14 Utility functions for two decision alternatives with a sample space defined by 
a random variable, y 
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Figure 6.15 Non-informative prior probability density function for y 
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6.3.5 Design of the Sample Space for Non-Informative Probabilities 
A sample space used in decision analysis is also an input for decision-based non-
informative prior probabilities, as shown in Equation 5.2.  A decision maker may have 
to make a decision about the sample space - for example, the range (lower and/or upper 
bound) of a random variable.   
The proposed decision-based method provides two requirements for the sample 
space: the sample space should include all possible preference outcomes and should be 
extended to the range or bins with constant consequence.  Those two requirements are 
related with the algorithm of the proposed method based on decision outcomes that 
include preference outcomes and decision consequences. 
Suppose a decision maker has a continuous random variable, x, two decision 
alternatives, A1 and A2, and consequences, as shown in the first row of Table 6.10.  
There are two possible preference outcomes, A1>A2 and A1<A2, and the range of x 
covers du/dx≈0 (where x≈5).  The range of 0≤x≤6 satisfies the two requirements.  The 
second case of the range, 0≤x≤4, has two preference outcomes, but du/dx does not reach 
zero (du/dx≈1.1).  This range may cause inconsistency when the random variable is 
transformed to the other.  The third case of the range, 0≤x≤2, does not satisfy both 
requirements.  The range covers only one preference outcome.  The derivative, du/dx 
at x=2, is not approaching zero.  Because of the missing preference outcome, the 
decision-based non-informative probability density function for the third case is very 
different from the first and the second cases. 
The two requirements do not mean that a decision maker must have the infinite 
range of random variables.  A decision maker can use any range of random variables 
which satisfy the two requirements.  For the given utility functions in Table 6.10, the 
consequences of A1 and A2 are constant for x larger than 5.  The decision-based non-
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informative prior density functions for any range that has an upper bound larger than 5 
will consistently provide the same expected utilities of A1 and A2, and accordingly the 
same optimal decisions. 
In practical decision making, the consequence reaches the maximum value before 
the random variable, x, does not reach the extreme.  For example, a decision maker may 
be concerned with extreme permeabilities - for example, 1,000 or 10,000 (md).  In this 
case, the productivity index for the reservoir and the peak production rate are large, so 
that the pipe line capacity may constrain the production rate as the constant.  The two 
extreme values of permeability, 1,000 and 10,000 (md), may not affect consequences in a 
decision matrix, because the production rate will be constant during a production life of 
interest.  In other words, two different states of nature do not make any difference in 
decision outcomes including preference in decision alternatives and decision 
consequences.  In this case, a decision-based method allows removing one of two states 
of nature without any change in expected utilities for decision alternatives.  Therefore, a 
decision maker’s concern is unnecessary. 
If a decision maker is sure about the range of random variables, the range can be 
used as a sample space for decision making, regardless of the two requirements from the 
proposed decision-based method.  The decision-based method will still provide an 
unbiased starting point for decision making with the given set of sample space.  For 
example, a reservoir engineer wants to define a sample space for porosity of the reservoir.  
The sample space does not need to cover the porosity value greater than unity by its 
definition.  However, if a decision maker is considering a range of porosity between 20 
and 30 (%), care should be taken based on the discussion in the previous paragraph. 
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Table 6.10 The effect of the range of a random variable on decision-based non-
informative prior probability 
Range 
of x 
Utility Function 
Probability Density 
Function 
Cumulative Density 
Function 
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0
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0
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P(X≤x)
Random variable, x
[0,4] 
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0
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[0,2] 
0
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P(x)
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0
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0.4
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0.8
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Cumulative
Probability
P(X≤x)
Random variable, x
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Chapter 7. Application of Proposed Method to Engineering Decision 
Making Problems 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to apply the decision-based method to engineering 
decision making problems.  The decision examples will show how the method works for 
practical decision making.  The practical implications of the decision-based method 
addressed in the previous chapter will be explained with the decision examples.  The 
decision examples focus on hydrocarbon exploration and production, which involves a 
large set of decision alternatives and significant uncertainty in the states of nature. 
  
7.2 PRODUCTION EXAMPLE 
Cullick et al. (2003) tested their optimization algorithm for decision making with 
a case history.  The objective of the decision case was maximizing the value of oil 
recovery from three units of a reservoir by determining the optimal production schedule.  
In this section, the example will be adapted and used to study non-informative 
probabilities for decision making analysis. 
 
7.2.1 Objectives 
This example is designed to make two points.  The first is to show the difference 
between non-informative prior probabilities from the principle of insufficient reason and 
the decision-based methods.  The difference will be visualized by comparing joint and 
marginal probability distribution of uncertain variables.  The second purpose is to show 
that the decision-based method is practically feasible in decisions with a large number of 
decision alternatives and states of nature.   
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7.2.2 Decision Description 
A company makes an investment on a new oil field that has two possible reservoir 
units (Figure 7.1).  A decision is made by comparing a variety of plans for production 
and finding the optimal plan that maximizes the expected value of net profit.  The 
investment plan includes the number of production wells for each unit and when they are 
installed over 10 years of production life.  The following assumptions are made for 
decision alternatives: 
 
1. The maximum number of wells for each unit is set 4. 
2. Either or both units should be in production at year 1. 
3. A unit can be installed and abandoned at any time in a 1 year interval. 
4. The oil production from a unit is controlled in a gathering center, not in 
individual wells in the unit. 
5. Once the valve in a gathering center is closed, it is not allowed to open later, 
but crossflow between two reservoir units can occur. 
 
The assumptions build 12,241 decision alternatives which consist of 12,240 Go 
options and 1 No go (Abandon) option.  Each alternative can be described with six 
decision variables: the number of wells, and years for the beginning and ending oil 
production for Units 1 and 2.  For example, Alternative 3412 means that the oil 
production is from 2 production wells in Unit 1 for 10 years, and from 4 production wells 
in Unit 2 for 8 years (through years 3 and 10).  The description on Alternative 3412 can 
be illustrated with Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.1 Production system for the production example 
 
 Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alternative 3412 Unit 1 2 wells 
 Unit 2   4 wells 
Figure 7.2 Description on Alternative 3412 for the production example 
 
There are many physical parameters affecting oil production associated with this 
decision case, including the reservoir drainage area, net pay, temperature, reservoir 
discontinuity, oil viscosity, permeability, skin factor, transmissibility between reservoir 
units, and pipeline flow capacity.  Because the decision is made based on monetary 
value, the economic parameters - oil price, costs for well installation, facility 
construction, maintenance, and inflation rate - are also important.  It is assumed that the 
uncertain variables include porosity, permeability, oil price, and cost for each unit.  The 
ranges of the variables are given in Table 7.1.  The rest of the parameters are constant, 
as shown in Table 7.2.  
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Table 7.1 Range of variables that are uncertain in the production example 
Variable  Range 
Porosity, φ (%) 1-40 
Permeability, k (md) 0.1-1,000 
Oil price ($/bbl) 30-50 
Well cost ($/well) 5,000,000-10,000,000 
Facility cost ($/Unit) 12,000,000-20,000,000 
 
Table 7.2 Assumed physical parameters for the production example 
Parameter Value 
Drainage area, A (acres) 
5000 for Unit 1 
2500 for Unit 2 
Net pay thickness, h (ft) 300 
Total compressibility, ct (psi-1) 0.00005 
Oil viscosity, μ (cp) 0.8 
Initial reservoir pressure, Pini (psi) 2,500 
Designated wellbore pressure, Pwf (psi) 2,000 
Radius of wellbore, rw (ft) 0.5 
Oil formation volume factor, Bo (RB/STB) 1.17 
Shape factor, CA (-) 30.88 
Skin factor, s (-) 0 
Maximum production rate, qLim (bbl/day) 20,000 
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7.2.3 Decision Framework 
The decision alternatives and associated uncertainty in this example can be 
illustrated with the decision tree in Figure 7.3.  The uncertainty is modeled as discrete 
scenarios with states of nature that represent a set of possible combinations of eight 
uncertain variables, as shown in Figure 7.4.  The uncertain variables include 
petrophysical parameters (porosity and permeability) and economic parameters (oil price 
and cost).  The uncertainty model consists of 50,625 (=2252) states of nature. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Decision tree for the production example 
Alternative 1: 1 well at Year 1 for Unit 1
           1 well at Year 1 for Unit 2 
State 2 
State 50625 
Alternative 2: 1 well at Year 1 for Unit 1
           1 well at Year 1-2 for Unit 2 
Alternative 3: 1 well at Year 1 for Unit 1
          1 well at Year 1-3 for Unit 2 
Alternative 12241: Abandon the oil field
State 1 
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Figure 7.4 Event tree for possible states of nature in the production example 
 
The consequence of each pair of a decision alternative and a state of nature is 
quantified by the net present value (NPV) of the net profit made by the pair.  To link the 
NPV and the pair, the modified tank model (in Section 7.3.2) is used and economic 
analysis is conducted.  The modified tank model helps obtain the time history of oil 
production as it relates to physical variables.  The time histories are used as input to 
cash flow analysis (CFA), as shown in Figure 7.5.  Oil price, cost, and discount factor 
are involved in the CFA to estimate a discounted NPV of the net profit for a given pair of 
decision alternative and state of nature.  The process for estimating NPV is illustrated in 
Figure 7.6.  The NPV was the measure of the consequence used by Cullick et al. (2003). 
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Figure 7.5 Establishing cash flow diagram for economic analysis 
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Figure 7.6 Process for calculating NPV of a given decision alternative and a set of 
uncertain variables 
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7.2.4 Non-Informative Prior Probabilities 
The decision matrix is constructed from the modified tank model and economic 
analysis based on the decision tree.  The number of preference outcomes is 236 in this 
example.  The preference outcomes are shown in Table 7.3.  The proposed algorithm 
provides the non-informative prior probabilities for 50,625 scenarios on the states of 
nature.  Marginal and joint PMFs for the non-informative priors are in Figures 7.7 
through 7.10. 
While the principle of insufficient reason provides a uniform probability 
distribution for all cases in Figures 7.7 through 7.10, the decision-based method yields 
probabilities with an irregular shape.  Some have a monotonically increasing or 
decreasing shape, others are concave, and the others are even more complicated.  There 
is no constraint on the shapes of the probability distributions because the decision-based 
method is achieving a balance among decision alternatives. 
The shape of the PMF is related to the number of preference outcomes 
corresponding to each bin.  If a bin has many corresponding preference outcomes, the 
non-informative prior probability assigned to the bin is large, because each preference 
outcome has the same probability.  For example, the bin of kUnit1=0.1 (md) includes 10 
preference outcomes, and the bin of kUnit1=1,000 (md) has 149 preference outcomes.  In 
a rough estimation, the non-informative prior probability assigned to the latter bin is 15 
times as large as the non-informative prior probability for the former.  The actual ratio 
of the non-informative prior probabilities for the latter to the former is 23.  The 
difference between the estimated and actual ratio is caused by the preference outcomes 
corresponding to both bins kUnit1=0.1 (md) and kUnit1=1,000 (md) and by the difference in 
the number of states of nature corresponding to each bin.  However, the number of 
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preference outcomes provides a good estimation of non-informative prior probabilities, as 
shown in Table 7.4. 
Figures 7.9 and 7.10 show relationships between the physical parameters for both 
reservoir units.  While k and φ are generally positively correlated because a larger pore 
may contribute more space for fluid flow, the correlations in Figure 7.9 are not based on 
any theories for porous medium - they are intended to contain no information.  In other 
words, the correlation between uncertain variables in non-informative probabilities in this 
study only captures the relationship to make a decision unbiased.  Any available 
information such as relationships based on data, models and theories is subsequently 
incorporated through Bayes’ theorem. 
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Table 7.3 Preference outcomes for the production example 
Preference Outcome ID 
Preference Outcome  
and the Most Preferred Decision Alternative 
1 
Alternative 84 > All other alternatives 
 
Alternative 84 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unit 1 1 well         
Unit 2 1 well    
2 
Alternative 85 > All other alternatives 
 
Alternative 85 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unit 1 1 well         
Unit 2 1 well   
M  M  
236 
Alternative 12200 > All other alternatives 
 
Alternative 12200 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unit 1 4 wells 
Unit 2            
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Figure 7.7 Marginal probability distributions for variables of Unit 1 
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Figure 7.8 Marginal probability distributions for variables of Unit 2 
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Figure 7.9 Joint probability distributions of porosity and permeability for (a) Unit 1 and 
(b) Unit 2 
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Figure 7.10 Joint probability distributions for permeabilities and porosities of both units 
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Table 7.4 Relationship between the number of preference outcomes and non-informative 
prior probabilities 
Variable 
for Unit 1 
Histogram of the Number of Preference 
Outcomes 
Marginal PMF 
Permeability 
(md) 
10 8 21
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(%) 
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86 71
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7.2.5 Summary 
The first objective of the production example is to show the difference between 
non-informative prior probabilities obtained from the principle of insufficient reason and 
the decision-based methods.  The non-informative priors are shown in Figures 7.7 
through 7.10.  The decision-based non-informative prior probabilities emphasize 
decision outcomes by assigning larger probabilities to states of nature that have unique 
preference outcomes.  In other words, the states of nature that have the same preference 
outcome have equally distributed probabilities.  This assignment is illustrated with 
Table 7.4.  
The second objective is to show that the decision-based method is applicable to 
practical decision making.  The algorithm for decision-based priors was applicable to 
the production example with 12,241 decision alternatives and 50,625 states of nature. 
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7.3 TRANSMISSIBILITY EXAMPLE 
This example focuses on how the connectivity or transmissibility between 
reservoir units affects decision making.  For example, well placement depends on the 
degree of connectivity.  If the transmissibility is infinite (perfect connectivity), the wells 
installed in one unit may recover oil from both units.  If the reservoir units are separated 
(zero connectivity), placing wells in both units may be the optimal decision alternative. 
 
7.3.1 Objectives 
The transmissibility example accomplishes four objectives.  The first objective is 
to show the importance of heterogeneity associated with decision making in petroleum 
exploration and production.  A parametric study and history matching with an actual oil 
field will be given to illustrate the significance of characterizing heterogeneity in decision 
making. 
The second objective is to compare the principle of insufficient reason with the 
decision-based method to obtain non-informative probabilities.  The probabilities will 
illustrate what the probability distribution looks like and why a decision-based non-
informative prior is different from that obtained by the principle of insufficient reason. 
The third objective is to show how to associate new information on which state of 
nature is more likely to occur with non-informative prior probabilities.  This example 
will demonstrate how the non-informative prior probabilities are used in practical 
decision making problems that are usually made with information.  The results of a 
sensitivity analysis will be given to show the influence of information on posterior 
probabilities, expected utilities for decision alternatives, optimal decision, and the value 
of perfect information. 
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The last objective is to show that a different decision making problem may have 
different non-informative prior probabilities.  The example will be given to show the 
influence of a deterministic parameter, well cost for Unit 1, on non-informative 
probabilities and on the value of perfect information (VPI). 
 
7.3.2 Reservoir Simulator: Modified Tank Model 
A tank-type model provides a simplified but analytical solution.  Tank-type 
models treat the reservoir as a homogeneous porous media.  Tank models are useful 
because they are simple, reducing calculation load, yet realistic enough to simulate 
reservoir performance based on Darcy’s law and mass balance.  Walsh and Lake (2003) 
discussed five variations in tank models.  The variations are about the number of layers 
(single- or multi-layer), interlayer communication (cross flow or no cross flow), and the 
compressibility of the fluid.  Guillot (1999) developed an analytical solution of the tank-
type model for the system of two layers in communication.  In his model, it is possible 
to consider both injection and production wells. 
In this dissertation, a modified version of the tank model is developed.  A 
schematic diagram of the model is shown in Figure 7.11.  The first objective of the new 
tank model is to introduce a system of two reservoir units with crossflow.  The system is 
basically the same with the tank model for two stratified layers with crossflow.  The 
second objective is to enable a rate-constrained flow.  The modified model works for 
both rate-constrained and pressure-constrained flow periods for high pressure or slightly 
compressible oil.  The modified model simulates depletion flow or pressure during 
primary recovery. 
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Figure 7.11 Schematic diagram of the modified tank model 
 
The modified tank model is based on the assumptions made in Walsh and Lake 
(2003) as follows: 
 
1. Three fluid components, stock-tank oil, surface gas, and stock-tank water, are  
  possible. 
2. Two fluid phases, oleic and aqueous, are possible.  
3. Stock-tank water does not partition into oleic phase. 
4. Stock-tank oil does not partition into aqueous phase. 
5. Water is immobile. 
6. Darcy’s law is valid 
7. There is no change in temperature. 
 
The modification of tank model is based on the additional assumption: 
 
8. Wellbore pressure is the same for all wells in a unit. 
9. The difference between the wellbore pressures in two units is constant. 
Unit 1 Unit 2
Export Line 
Crossflow
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Assumptions 8 and 9 are from the concept of constant pressure gradient in a wellbore.  
The reservoir unit is assumed to be thin enough to use a constant wellbore pressure and 
fluid flow occurs at the same depth for all wellbores.  Assumption 9 is based on pressure 
equilibrium in wellbore and pipeline.  Because wellbores in two units are connected 
through an export line, pressures in production wells interact with each other and 
ultimately reach a state of equilibrium.  In the equilibrium limit, assumption 8 and a 
constant wellbore pressure gradient should be valid.  These constraints lead to a constant 
pressure difference between wells for each unit.  
Mathematically, the modified tank model is based on a solution of a system of 
nonhomogeneous first-order ordinary differential equations (ODE) with an initial 
condition.  The governing equations include mass balance (Equations 7.1, and 7.2), 
Darcy’s law (Equations 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5) and the equation for a constant pressure 
difference (Equation 7.6). 
 
                   
( )XF11t1P1 qqdt
Pd
cV −−=  (7.1)
( )XF22t2P2 qqdt
Pd
cV −−=  (7.2)
( )wf1111 PPJq −=  (7.3)
( )wf2222 PPJq −=  (7.4)
( )12XF PPTq −=  (7.5)
wfwf2wf1 ΔPPP +=  (7.6)
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where Vp1 and Vp2 are the pore volume, ct1 and ct2 are the total compressibility of Unit 1 
and 2, q1 and q2 are the production rate, J1 and J2 are productivity indices, 1P  and 2P  
are average reservoir pressure, and Pwf1 and Pwf2 are wellbore pressure for each unit.  qXF 
is the rate of crossflow and T represents the transmissibility.  There are two initial 
conditions for initial reservoir pressure in each unit.  
The solution of the system of ODEs varies with a total production rate, qT, which 
is a sum of q1 and q2.  If qT is less than or equal to the limit of total production rate, qLim, 
Pwf1 and Pwf2 are constant.  In this case, depletion flow dominates.  If qT is greater than 
qLim, qT is forced to be equal to qLim and Pwf1 and Pwf2 are functions of time.  In this 
situation, a plateau production period occurs.  Equations 7.7 through 7.11 show the 
solution for pressure-specified and Equations 7.12 through 7.16 represent rate-specified 
flow.  Detailed steps in the derivation and solutions for each case are given in Appendix 
C.  The solutions are 
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For flexible handling in application, this production model is used with a set of 
time increments.  The time increments enable input of different values for decision 
parameters or uncertain variables.  For example, the number of wells for a certain unit 
and the productivity index can vary with the increments.  If a decision maker wants to 
increase the number of wells with time, the system of time increments would be 1 well 
for Year 1, 2 wells for Year 2, 3 wells for Year 3, and so on.  The resultant average 
reservoir pressures of one increment go into the input (initial) condition for the 
subsequent increment.  
Figures 7.12 through 7.14 show example cases of the modified tank model.  It is 
assumed in these examples that the number of wells for each unit does not change during 
the production life.  Input parameters are assumed, as shown in Table 7.5.  The first 
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case in Figure 7.12 shows depletion flow without a plateau because the total oil 
production, qtotal, which is the sum of the production from both units, is not limited.  As 
shown in Figure 7.12, reservoir pressures for both units and their production rates and the 
total production rate decay exponentially.  The wellbore pressures for wells in both units 
are constant during the production life.  Because there is no communication between 
units and the wellbore pressures for the coupled wells keeps constant, the behavior of the 
system of units is equivalent to the sum of the behavior of two separate units.   
In the second case, the total production is limited.  As shown in Figure 7.13, the 
limit causes a plateau period in an early stage of production life.  During the plateau 
period, wellbore pressures decrease linearly.  While the total production rate is constant 
during the plateau period, the production rates for individual units are not constant.  The 
reason for this difference in production rates is that there is no connectivity between 
units.  In the case of the separated units, the difference in productivity index causes 
different rates of decay in average reservoir pressure.  Therefore, the difference in 
reservoir average pressure and wellbore pressure varies with time.  The production rates 
for the two units are not constant during the plateau period.  The production rates would 
be constant if there is a large degree of communication between units, as shown in Figure 
7.14.  The communication enables equality in average reservoir pressure for both units, 
and the average reservoir pressure decreases almost linearly with time.  In fact, if the 
communication is perfect, the two units behave like one single reservoir and have 
identical pressure histories.  The difference in production rates for units is caused by the 
difference in productivity index. 
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Table 7.5 Input parameters in three example cases in Figures 7.12 through 7.14 
Parameter  
Example 1 
(Figure 7.12)
Example 2 
(Figure 7.13) 
Example 3 
(Figure 7.14) 
Drainage area (acres) 
1,000 (Unit 1) 
500 (Unit 2) 
Net pay thickness (ft) 150 
Porosity (%) 31 
Permeability (md) 
30 (Unit 1) 
5 (Unit 2) 
Total compressibility (1/psi) 0.00008 
Initial reservoir pressure (psi) 1,640 
Designated wellbore 
pressure 
(psi) 199 
Oil viscosity (cp) 0.35 
Maximum production 
rate 
(STB/day) ∞ 25,000 25,000 
Transmissibility  (RB/psi/day) 0 0 100 
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Figure 7.12 Simulation results with no production rate limit and no communication 
between the two units 
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Figure 7.13 Simulation results with production rate limit and without communication 
between the two units 
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Figure 7.14 Simulation results with production rate limit and large communication 
between two units 
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7.3.3 Communication between Production Units 
Connectivity between production units is an important consideration in predicting 
well performance.  The connectivity or communication is quantified by the 
transmissibility.  The transmissibility is defined by Equation 7.16 (Guillot, 1999). 
 
μw
kAT =  (7.16)
 
The transmissibility is a function of a porous media property (the permeability, k), the 
geometry of the porous media (the area of the cross section, A, and the length of flow, 
w), and a fluid property (the viscosity of the fluid, μ).  If connectivity is perfect - in 
other words, infinite transmissibility - two production units can be considered a single 
unit.  If there is no connectivity, the transmissibility is equal to zero and the two 
production units are totally separated except at the surface.  The model used in the 
modified tank model assumes that there is a thin transition zone between two production 
units.  The properties in Equation 7.16 - k, A, and w - are considered parameters of the 
transition zone. 
Consider a simple production case to understand the production performance for 
both extremes of transmissibility.  Figure 7.15 illustrates a schematic diagram for oil 
production from a well in each unit.  Two representative factors, reservoir pore volume 
(Vp) and productivity index (J) for a well, characterize well production in each unit 
above.  The flow, qXF, indicates crossflow caused by a pressure difference between the 
two units.  With a simple tank-type production model, the production rate histories are 
obtained by the following equations: 
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Figure 7.15 Schematic diagram of possibly compartmentalized reservoir 
 
For T=0,  
tp1
1
1 cV
J
λ =  (7.17) 
tp2
2
2 cV
J
λ =  (7.18) 
( )tλexpΔpJq 1ini11 −=  (7.19) 
( )tλexpΔpJq 2ini22 −=  (7.20) 
210T qqq +==  (7.21) 
 
For T=∞ case, two units are in the same tank-type reservoir.  Therefore, the 
average pressures of both units are equal to each other. 
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( ) ( )tλexpΔpJJq Totalini21T −+=∞=  (7.23) 
 
where total compressibility, ct, and initial pressure difference between reservoir and 
wellbore, Δpini, are kept constant.  The parameter, λ, is the decay constant, which 
indicates the rate of depletion. 
The total production from both wells in this example is shown in Figure 7.16.  
The first case is when both units have the same pore volume and productivity indices.  
The total well production for T=0 and T=∞ are identical.  For the other cases, the 
difference in productivity index or reservoir pore volume causes different total 
production, depending on the transmissibility.  The production rate when there is no 
connectivity decreases faster with time than that when there is perfect connectivity.  In 
the second case of J1=J2 and Vp1>Vp2, the total oil recovery of T=0 is less than that of 
T=∞ at an early stage and becomes greater at a later stage.  These changes of production 
rate at later stages do not necessarily make larger benefit because large production in the 
early stages is generally most preferred by a decision maker.  This factor is considered 
in the economic (consequence) analysis where the time value of money is included. 
The simple theoretical example above illustrates the potential importance of the 
connectivity between production units.  The connectivity influences the well behavior, 
and accordingly, the total oil recovery and net profit.  If the connectivity is ignored and 
perfect communication is assumed, the net profit might be overestimated and a decision 
might mislead a development strategy. 
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Figure 7.16 Difference in well behavior for extreme cases of well connectivity under 
three circumstances 
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The importance of connectivity can also be illustrated by a real case history.  
Production data of two wells in BP’s Holstein oil field was obtained from the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS) (2008).  Monthly oil production and the production per 
month were computed and analyzed for the two wells, A005 and A006, that were thought 
to be located in the same channel (Wiseman et al., 2007).  The modified tank-type 
model was used for history matching based on least square error on the monthly oil 
production.  Microsoft Excel Solver is used to find the optimized solution.  The 
detailed procedure and results of the history matching are presented in Appendix A.   
History matching results are shown in Figures 7.17 and 7.18.  The matching 
curves show a good match within the early part of production history; after 2½ years, the 
difference between the data and the model increases.  A comparison of the total oil 
recovery between the data and the model is presented in Table 7.6.  As seen in Figure 
7.18, the average reservoir pressures for both units are not equal with time.  This means 
that the connectivity between the two units is not perfect.  The matching gives 
transmissibility between the units equal to 59 (bbl/psi/day).  The estimated 
transmissibility is larger than the productivity index for both wells - 25 and 49 
(bbl/psi/day) for Units 1 and 2, respectively - but not large enough to imply perfect 
communication between units.   
 
Table 7.6 Comparison of oil recovery from actual data and history matching 
 Database History matching 
Unit 1 5.474 (mmbbl) 4.703 (mmbbl) 
Unit 2 5.137 (mmbbl) 4.187 (mmbbl) 
Total 10.611 (mmbbl) 8.890 (mmbbl) 
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Figure 7.17 History matching between production data from MMS and regression results  
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Figure 7.18 Time history of production rate and average reservoir pressure obtained by 
history matching with a tank-type model 
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If transmissibility is set equal to infinity, the well behavior under perfect 
connectivity can be obtained.  This behavior is what a decision maker would expect if 
the wells are assumed to be connected.  Figures 7.19 and 7.20 show the well behavior 
under perfect connectivity.  The two curves for the average reservoir pressures versus 
time are identical in this case.  Oil production under perfect connectivity was greater 
than that found from history matching (Table 7.7).  The difference between total oil 
productions is 105,040 bbl.  If oil price is $100/bbl, the monetary difference is equal to 
$10.5 MM.  Therefore, the assumption of the perfect connectivity might affect a 
decision about how to produce from this reservoir. 
 
Table 7.7 Comparison of oil recovery from history matching case and perfect 
connectivity case 
 History matching 
(T=59 bbl/psi/day) 
History matching 
+ T→∞ 
Unit 1 4.703 (mmbbl) 4.094 (mmbbl) 
Unit 2 4.187 (mmbbl) 4.901 (mmbbl) 
Total 8.890 (mmbbl) 8.995 (mmbbl) 
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Figure 7.19 Time history of production rate and average reservoir pressure obtained by 
forcing perfect connectivity with a tank-type model 
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Figure 7.20 Comparison of oil production histories from database (unknown 
transmissibility), history matching (back-calculated connectivity), and a tank 
model (perfect connectivity) 
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7.3.4 Decision Description 
A decision maker designs production schedules based on primary recovery from 
the field.  The oil field consists of two reservoir units, as shown in Figure 7.21.  It is 
assumed that Unit 1 has larger productivity index, pore volume, permeability, and cost 
compared to Unit 2.  If the transmissibility is large - that is, two units are not separated 
and in perfect communication - it is not necessary to install wells in Unit 1, because oil in 
Unit 1 can be recovered from Unit 2 with less cost.  In the other extreme, no 
communication between units, a decision maker may place wells in both units if the 
production from individual units makes the net profit greater than zero.  
 
 
Figure 7.21 Reservoir units with communication 
 
There are many possible decision alternatives.  In this example, the maximum 
number of wells for the individual unit is limited to 4, and the production period in scope 
is 10 years.  At least one of units must be in production during the period.  For 
Export Line 
Unit 1 
Crossflow 
Unit 2
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example, it is not allowed to close all valves of production wells in both units for any 
time period.  The number of wells for each unit is set constant during production.  
From these assumptions, a decision maker ends up with 12,241 decision alternatives, 
including a “No go” option, which means that the field is abandoned if unprofitable.  
The set of decision alternatives is the same one used in the previous production example.  
The only uncertain variable in this example is the transmissibility between reservoir 
units.  The transmissibility is discretized into 12 possible bins with 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, …, 
51, and 102 (RB/psi/day).  The other parameters are assumed to be deterministic – their 
values are shown in Table 7.8.   
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Table 7.8 Deterministic parameters in transmissibility example 
Parameter  Unit 1 Unit 2 
Drainage area (acres) 1,000 500 
Net pay thickness (ft) 50 50 
Porosity (%) 20 20 
Permeability (md) 10 5 
Total compressibility (1/psi) 0.00005 0.00005 
Initial reservoir pressure (psi) 2,150 2,150 
Designated wellbore pressure (psi) 1,500 1,500 
Oil viscosity (cp) 0.8 0.8 
Discount rate (%) 5 5 
Oil price ($/bbl) 40 40 
Facility cost ($ MM/unit) 10 5 
Well cost ($ MM/well) 4 2 
Maintenance cost ($ MM/year) 1 0.5 
Maximum production rate (STB/day) 1500 
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7.3.5 Decision Framework 
The decision with 12,241 alternatives and 12 states of nature is illustrated with a 
decision tree in Figure 7.22.  Table 7.9 shows the most preferred alternative for each 
state of nature.  For small transmissibility, such as states 1 through 5, the most preferred 
alternatives represent oil production from both of the reservoir units.  For states of larger 
transmissibility, the only unit in production is Unit 1.  This means that the production 
from Unit 1 is profitable because of a larger productivity index than Unit 2.  If the 
transmissibility is much larger, the production from Unit 2 is profitable, because wells in 
Unit 2 are capable of producing the oil in Unit 1 with less cost. 
 
 
Figure 7.22 Decision tree for transmissibility example 
102
51
0.2 
0.1
Alternative 1: Unit 1 (1 well for first 1 year) 
           Unit 2 (1 well for first 1 year) 
Alternative 12241: No go
Alternative 6819: Unit 1(4 wells for 10 years)  
              Unit 2(3 wells for last 4 years) 
 
0
Transmissibility
(RB/psi/day) 
 133
Table 7.9 The most preferred decision alternative for each state of nature in the 
transmissibility example 
State of nature 
Number 
Transmissibility, T 
(RB/psi/day) 
The Most Preferred Decision Alternative 
1 0 
Alternative 3285 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unit 1 2 wells 
Unit 2 2 wells  
2 0.1 
3 0.2 
4 0.4 
5 0.8 
Alternative 3340 
Unit 1 2 wells 
Unit 2 3 wells  
6 1.6 
Alternative 12190 
Unit 1 3 wells 
Unit 2            
7 3.2 
8 6.4 
9 12.8 
10 25.6 
11 51.2 
12 102.4 
Alternative 12240 
Unit 1           
Unit 2 4 wells  
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7.3.6 Non-Informative Prior Probabilities 
The number of preference outcomes is 4 in this example.  The preference 
outcomes are: 
Alternative 3285 > (All other decision alternatives) 
Alternative 3340 > (All other decision alternatives)  
Alternative 12190 > (All other decision alternatives)  
Alternative 12240 > (All other decision alternatives)  
The method for decision-based priors assigns the same probability of ¼ to the four 
preference outcomes.  Other than these four decision alternatives, the remaining 12,237 
decision alternatives make no difference to the preference outcomes and non-informative 
probabilities, because they are not preferred in any particular state of nature. 
Because the state S1 is the only state corresponding to the preference outcome, 
Alternative 3285>, and the state S6 is the only state corresponding to the preference 
outcome, Alternative 12190>, the probabilities for S1 and S6 are equal to ¼.  For the 
states of nature, S2 through S5, corresponding to the preference outcome, Alternative 
3340>, equal probabilities are assigned - there is little difference in the increment of 
utilities.  In the same manner, the states of nature, S7 through S12, with the same 
preference outcome, Alternative 12240> have the same probabilities.  
The decision-based non-informative prior probabilities are shown in Figure 7.23.  
The shapes of the non-informative prior probability distributions are different from each 
other for the decision-based method (Figure 7.23a) and the principle of insufficient 
reason (Figure 7.23b).  The non-informative prior from the decision-based method 
shows two spikes (larger probabilities) at T=0 and T=1.6 RB/psi/day.  Those states of 
nature are more weighted than other states because they are the extreme states that drive a 
decision. 
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(a) Decision-based method 
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(b) Principle of insufficient reason 
Figure 7.23 Non-informative prior probabilities for transmissibility example 
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The decision-based method provides an unbiased starting point for the decision 
example shown in Figure 7.24.  Four decision alternatives - Alternatives 3285, 3340, 
12190, and 12240 - can be the most preferred decision alternative for a given sample 
space with 12 bins.  If the probabilities that each of four decision alternatives is the most 
preferred are plotted, the decision-based method provides the uniform probabilities 
shown in Figure 7.24a, while the principle of insufficient reason shows that certain 
decision alternatives are preferred to others, as shown in Figure 7.24b.   
 
0
0.5
1
1 2 3 4
Probability
Alternative 
3285>
Alternative 
12240>
Alternative 
12190>
Alternative 
3340>
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
 
          (a) Decision-based method 
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          (b) Principle of insufficient reason 
Figure 7.24 Starting point for transmissibility example provided by the decision-based 
method and the principle of insufficient reason 
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The principle of insufficient reason and the decision-based method lead to a 
different decision in this example, as shown in Figure 7.25.  The principle of insufficient 
reason provides that Alternative 12190 (production with three wells from Years 1 through 
10 for Unit 1 and no well for Unit 2) is the best alternative, giving an expected monetary 
value of $16.8 MM.  In a decision-based method, Alternative 3340 (production with two 
wells from Year 1 through 10 for Unit 1 and three wells from Year 1 through 10 for Unit 
2) is the best decision alternative, with an expected value of $15.9 MM. 
The decision based on the principle of insufficient reason focuses on high return 
from the oil production.  The states of nature with large benefit, such as states, S10 
through S12, are weighted much more than the other states of nature.  The decision based 
on the principle of insufficient reason yields Alternative 12190, which works profitably 
for states with large transmissibility but is not economical for states with small 
transmissibility, as shown in Figure 7.26.  However, the method for decision-based 
priors has no bias in the preference in decision alternatives, so the method chooses 
Alternative 3340.  Alternative 3340 is the plan that places production wells in both 
units.  It gives the net profit that varies little with the states of nature, as shown in Figure 
7.26. 
The difference in non-informative probabilities may produce the difference in the 
value of information about T.  The value of perfect information analysis provides a VPI 
of $2.5 MM when the principle of insufficient reason is applied, and $1.9 MM when a 
decision-based method is employed.  Because the principle of insufficient reason leads 
to Alternative 12190, which produces a large profit only for some states, there is potential 
risk of a significant loss if the transmissibility is small.  The decision-based method, on 
the other hand, gives Alternative 3340, which works fine with any states of nature.  
Additional information does not make any contribution on avoiding risk, because the loss 
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is small whatever the transmissibility.  This result does not mean that the VPI from the 
decision-based method is always larger than that from the principle of insufficient reason.  
This result should not be generalized because the prior probability distribution is no the 
only factor affecting the VPI.  The VPI is also affected by the other factor, a set of 
consequences in decision matrix. 
 
Alternative 12190 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Unit 1 3 wells 
Unit 2 No well  
Alternative 3340 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Unit 1 2 wells 
Unit 2 3 wells  
(a) Method based on the principle of 
insufficient reason 
(b) Decision-based method 
Figure 7.25 Different optimal decisions by the principle of insufficient reason and the 
decision-based method 
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Alternative 3285
Alternative 3340
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Transmissibility, T (RB/psi/day)
 
Figure 7.26 Consequences made by each pair of decision alternatives and states of nature. 
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7.3.7 Non-Informative Prior Probabilities and Decision with Information 
Bayes’ theorem helps associate new knowledge from information to the previous 
state of knowledge represented by a non-informative probability distribution.  Suppose 
we have vague information that is described by the likelihood of the information for each 
state of nature: 
P(Information|Transmissibility<25 RB/psi/day)=0.2 
P(Information|Transmissibility>25 RB/psi/day)=0.9 
The likelihood function means that the information is much more likely when the 
transmissibility is greater than 25 RB/psi/day and less likely when the transmissibility is 
less than 25 RB/psi/day.  The likelihood function represents a way to illustrate no more 
than the given information contains.  Therefore, it does not rely on mathematical 
assumptions, such as Gaussian and/or lognormal probability distributions.  The 
likelihood function is shown in Figure 7.27 and the updated probabilities through Bayes’ 
theorem are shown in Figure 7.28.  The updated probabilities have more weight on 
states where the transmissibility is less than 10 RB/psi/day. 
Due to the changes in probabilities, decision making with the information 
produces different expected utilities for the decision alternatives.  With the information, 
the decisions for both the principle of insufficient reason and the method for decision-
based priors are the same - Alternative 12190 (three wells for Unit 1 through 10 years and 
no well for Unit 2), as shown in Figure 7.29.   
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Figure 7.27 Example of a likelihood function, which represents the information by saying 
that the information is more likely for T<10 (RB/psi/day) 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
4
0.
8
1.
6
3.
2
6.
4
12
.8
25
.6
51
.2
10
2
Updated
Probability
Transmissibility (RB/psi/day)  
Figure 7.28 Posterior probabilities updated with previous state of knowledge (complete 
ignorance) in Figure 7.23a and the likelihood function for new information 
in Figure 7.27. 
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Alternative 12190 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Unit 1 3 wells 
Unit 2 No well  
Alternative 12190 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Unit 1 3 wells 
Unit 2 No well  
(a) Method based on the principle of 
insufficient reason 
(b) Decision-based method 
Figure 7.29 Decisions by the principle of insufficient reason and decision-based method 
with information 
 
Suppose we have opposite information that is still vague, as described by the 
likelihood of the information for each state of nature: 
P(Information|Transmissibility<1 RB/psi/day)=0.9 
P(Information|Transmissibility>1 RB/psi/day)=0.2 
The likelihood function is shown in Figure 7.30, and the updated probabilities through 
Bayes’ theorem are shown in Figure 7.31.  Because the information implies that states 
with large transmissibility are more likely, the right tail of the non-informative prior 
probabilities in Figure 7.23 has more weight. 
The optimal decision in this case is the same with or without information, as show 
in Figure 7.25.  
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Figure 7.30 Example of a likelihood function, which represents the information saying 
that the information is more likely for T<1 (RB/psi/day) 
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Figure 7.31 Posterior probabilities updated with previous state of knowledge (complete 
ignorance) in Figure 7.23a and the likelihood function for new information 
in Figure 7.30. 
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7.3.8 Non-Informative Prior Probabilities and the Value of Perfect Information 
The decision-based method may result in different non-informative prior 
probabilities when the decision matrix for a decision making problem has been changed.  
An example of a change in the decision matrix is a change in deterministic variables.  In 
this section, a sensitivity analysis will be conducted with well cost for Unit 1.  The 
response of the sensitivity analysis is the value of perfect information (VPI) in this case.  
VPI is the maximum value of information that a decision maker can get when the 
information can clarify with certainty which state of nature will occur.  Because VPI 
depends on the probabilities, the decision-based method is expected to provide a different 
result from the principle of insufficient reason.  The base case of the sensitivity 
variables is in Table 7.6. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 7.32.  The curves from 
the principle of insufficient reason and the decision-based method are different from each 
other.  It is not possible to generalize that the VPI of one method is always larger than 
the VPI of the other.  As shown in Figure 7.321, the maximum VPIs occur at different 
well cost for Unit 1, and the maximum VPIs are not the same. 
Detailed information on non-informative prior probabilities, the VPI, and the 
optimal decision for three values of well cost for Unit 1, is given in Tables 7.10 and 7.11.  
The results are reasonable in that both methods provide the optimal decision with more 
wells in Unit 1 and less wells in Unit 2 if the well cost for Unit 1 is small, and with less 
wells in Unit 1 and more wells in Unit 2 otherwise.  While the principle of insufficient 
reason provides the same uniform probabilities for any well cost for Unit 1, the decision-
based method provides different non-information prior probabilities.  These different 
sets of probabilities on states of nature may result in different expected utilities for the 
decision alternatives, different optimal decision, and different VPIs.   
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The same optimal decision does not guarantee the same decision-based non-
informative prior.  For example, Alternative 12199, selected for the range of well costs 
for Unit 1 from 0 to 1.5 ($ MM), has three different sets of decision-based non-
informative prior probabilities, as shown in Table 7.11.  
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Figure 7.32 Variation of the value of perfect information (VPI) with well cost for Unit 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.10 Three values of well cost for Unit 1 and their influence on the decision-based 
non-informative prior probabilities, the optimal decisions, and the VPIs 
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Well Cost 
for Unit 1 
 
Principle of 
Insufficient Reason 
Decision-Based 
Method 
Non-informative 
prior probabilities 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
4
0.
8
1.
6
3.
2
6.
4
12
.8
25
.6
51
.2
10
2
Probability
Transmissibility (RB/psi/day)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
4
0.
8
1.
6
3.
2
6.
4
12
.8
25
.6
51
.2
10
2
Probability
Transmissibility (RB/psi/day)
VPI $1.5 MM $2.5 MM 
Alternative 12200 Alternative 12190 
4 wells in Unit 1 (Year 1-10) 3 wells in Unit 1 (Year 1-10) 
$1 MM 
Optimal decision 
No well in Unit 2 No well in Unit 2 
Non-informative 
prior probabilities 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
4
0.
8
1.
6
3.
2
6.
4
12
.8
25
.6
51
.2
10
2
Probability
Transmissibility (RB/psi/day)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
4
0.
8
1.
6
3.
2
6.
4
12
.8
25
.6
51
.2
10
2
Probability
Transmissibility (RB/psi/day)
VPI $2.4 MM $1.7 MM 
Alternative 12240 Alternative 3340 
No well in Unit 1 2 wells in Unit 1 (Year 1-10) 
$4 MM 
Optimal decision 
4 wells in Unit 2 (Year 1-10) 3 wells in Unit 2 (Year 1-10) 
Non-informative 
prior probabilities 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
4
0.
8
1.
6
3.
2
6.
4
12
.8
25
.6
51
.2
10
2
Probability
Transmissibility (RB/psi/day)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
4
0.
8
1.
6
3.
2
6.
4
12
.8
25
.6
51
.2
10
2
Probability
Transmissibility (RB/psi/day)
VPI $0.44 MM $0.79 MM 
Alternative 12240 Alternative 12240 
No well in Unit 1 No well in Unit 1 
$9 MM 
Optimal decision 
4 wells in Unit 2 (Year 1-10) 4 wells in Unit 2 (Year 1-10) 
Table 7.11 The influence of the well cost for Unit 1 on the optimal decisions and the 
decision-based non-informative prior probabilities 
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Well Cost for Unit 1 
($ MM) 
Optimal Decision 
Decision-Based 
Non-Informative Prior 
0-1.3 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
4
0.
8
1.
6
3.
2
6.
4
12
.8
25
.6
51
.2
10
2
Probability
Transmissibility (RB/psi/day)  
1.4 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
1.5 
Alternative 12199 
4 wells in Unit 1 (Year 1-9) 
No well in Unit 2 
1.6-2.3 0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
2.4-3.3 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
3.4 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
3.5 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
3.6-3.7 
Alternative 5005 
3 wells in Unit 1 (Year 1-10) 
2 wells in Unit 2 (Year 1-10) 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
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Table 7.11 (Continued) 
Well Cost for Unit 1 
($ MM) 
Optimal Decision 
Decision-Based 
Non-Informative Prior 
3.8 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
4
0.
8
1.
6
3.
2
6.
4
12
.8
25
.6
51
.2
10
2
Probability
Transmissibility (RB/psi/day)
3.9-4.4 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
4.5-5.6 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
5.7-5.8 
Alternative 3340 
2 wells in Unit 1 (Year 1-10) 
3 wells in Unit 2 (Year 1-10) 
5.9-7.1 0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
7.2-7.9 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
8.0-8.4 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
8.5-10 
Alternative 12240 
No well in Unit 1 
4 wells in Unit 2 (Year 1-10) 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Probability
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7.3.9 Summary 
The transmissibility example began with a parametric study and history matching 
of Holstein field to show the importance of heterogeneity associated with decision 
making in petroleum exploration and production.  The transmissibility changed well 
behavior, profit made by oil production, and ultimately the optimal decision in decision 
analysis. 
The decision-based non-informative prior probabilities for the transmissibility 
example were given in Figure 7.23a.  The decision-based non-informative prior was not 
uniform, and the detailed discussion on what made the non-informative prior was given. 
The method to associate new information was illustrated with exemplary 
likelihood functions in Figures 7.27 and 7.30.  The influence of the new information 
was highlighted by posterior probabilities and optimal decisions in Figures 7.28, 7.29, 
and 7.31.  It was also shown that non-informative priors are important in decision 
making if new information is not informative.   
A sensitivity analysis was performed to show that different decisions may have 
different non-informative priors.  For the example, a deterministic parameter, well cost 
for Unit 1, was selected as a variable in the sensitivity analysis.  The difference in non-
informative priors provided different expected utilities for decision alternatives, different 
values of perfect information, and different optimal decisions (Figure 7.32 and Table 
7.10).  The detailed influence of the well cost for Unit 1 was shown in Table 7.11. 
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7.4 SPATIAL VARIABILITY EXAMPLE  
This spatial variability example is inspired by Journel and Deutsch’s work (1993).  
Journel and Deutsch treat the heterogeneous porous media with no information as a set of 
stochastic realizations with maximum entropy.  In this study, the heterogeneous porous 
media will be modeled with a multivariate probability density function based on the 
decision-based method.  The decision-based non-informative prior probabilities will 
demonstrate that the mathematical assumption made for convenience in dealing with 
complete ignorance, can lead to biased decision making by imposing subjectivity.  This 
will also show the proposed decision-based method provides a basis for decision making 
without assuming more than the given information. 
 
7.4.1 Objectives 
There are three objectives in this spatial variability example.  The first is to show 
the difference in non-informative probabilities given by the principle of insufficient 
reason and decision-based methods.  The second objective is to illustrate the point made 
by Journel and Deutsch (1993), that applying the principle of insufficient reason to  
states of nature in a decision making problem is an irrational approach and could lead to 
under-representing the uncertainty in the outcomes of the decision.  Journel and Deutsch 
indicated that maximizing uncertainty in the input parameters to reflect a lack of 
information does not guarantee maximum uncertainty in the response of interest.  They 
observed the opposite behavior in their results from geostatistic simulations.  The 
maximum uncertainty model parameters led to minimum variability in response 
variables, such as breakthrough time and oil recovery.  In this spatial variability 
example, it will be demonstrated that the maximum uncertainty in states of nature may 
not yield the maximum uncertainty in decision making.  The last objective is to show 
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that a change in the decision framework may change the non-informative prior 
probabilities.   
 
7.4.2 Reservoir Simulator: Two-Dimensional Grid Simulator 
A tank model treats a reservoir as a homogeneous unit with infinite 
transmissibility.  The tank-type model is not capable of including spatial variations of 
petrophysical properties.  In actuality, subsurface conditions can have significant spatial 
variability.  For the purpose of considering the spatial variability, multi-dimensional 
grid simulators are widely used in oil industry.  In this study, a simpler type of grid 
simulator is developed and coded for a decision example. 
A schematic diagram of the reservoir for the simulator is shown in Figure 7.33.  
The reservoir in the model is discretized into 16 cells.  The reservoir simulator provides 
an implicit solution for time histories of reservoir and wellbore pressure at each cell.  
The time history of the production rate can be easily calculated from the pressure history 
at the well location and the productivity index. 
The flow between adjacent cells is modeled with the transmissibility at each cell 
face.  The transmissibility is equal to a harmonic average of the permeabilities of the 
cells.  Well production is modeled by Darcy’s law, with the productivity index as in the 
tank model.  Material balance for each cell yields 16 equations, where the unknowns are 
16 values of pressure at each cell after a certain time interval.  In the mathematical 
sense, this model involves solving 16 simultaneous equations.  The pressure time 
histories can be built by repeating the process above at different time steps. 
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Figure 7.33 Schematic diagram for two-dimensional grid reservoir simulator 
 
This model also has two solutions: pressure-constrained and rate-constrained.  
These constraints are on the production well, not the model.  The two cases crate 
differences in constructing the simultaneous equations, but they make use of the same 
process of matrix inversion.  Figures 7.33 through 7.35 show the results of example 
cases, one with a constraint on the production rate (Figure 7.34) and the other without the 
limit (Figures 7.34 and 7.35).  The input for both cases is shown in Table 7.12.  For 
both cases, pressure histories at each element are obtained (upper figures in Figures 7.33 
and 7.34) and production rate histories are computed based on pressure history at the well 
location, (2,2) in this example.  As seen in Figure 7.35, this reservoir model is capable 
Export Line 
Well 
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of simulating transient flow when the production rate is not constrained.  The MATLAB 
code used in production modeling is shown in Appendix D. 
 
Table 7.12 Input for example cases of two-dimensional grid reservoir simulator 
Parameter 
Pressure-
constraint 
Rate- 
constraint 
Drainage area, A (acres) 300 
Porosity, φ (%) 30 
Net pay thickness, h (ft) 100 
Total compressibility, ct (psi-1) 0.00005 
Oil viscosity, μ (cp) 0.8 
Initial reservoir pressure, Pini (psi) 2,500 
Designated wellbore pressure, Pwf (psi) 2,000 
Radius of wellbore, rw (ft) 0.5 
Oil formation volume factor, Bo (RB/STB) 1.0 
Shape factor, CA (-) 30.88 
Skin factor, s (-) 0 
Time increment, ∆t (day) 5 
Maximum production rate, qLim (bbl/day) ∞ 800 
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Figure 7.34 Well behavior of the example case under a production rate limit 
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Figure 7.35 Well behavior of the example case under no constraint on production rate 
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Figure 7.36 Pressure distributions over domain and their decay with time (No constraint 
on the production rate) 
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7.4.3 Decision Description 
A company wants to make a decision about the number of wells for a 200-acre oil 
reservoir, as shown in Figure 7.37.  The location of wells is near the center of the 
estimated drainage area, and the maximum number of wells is two, considering the 
export pipeline capacity and the scale of this project.  There are three decision 
alternatives: abandon this oil field, single well production, and production with two wells. 
Most of the physical and economical parameters are deterministic, as presented in 
Table 7.13.  The only uncertain variable is the spatial distribution of permeability, k, 
which is one of major parameters affecting oil production.  The whole drainage area is 
divided into 16 cells and identification numbers are assigned to every grid for 
convenience, as shown in Figure 7.38.  The uncertain variable can be described with 16 
separate uncertain variables - k for cell 1, k for cell 2, and so on.  In this example, the 
multivariate probability distribution is discretized with three possible permeability values 
- 2, 4, and 8 (md) - for each of the 16 variables.  This simplified case yields a large 
number of states of nature.  The bins for the discretized multivariate probability 
distribution consist of 316 =43,046,721 states of nature. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.37 Oil reservoir for the spatial variability example 
Export Line 
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Figure 7.38 Identification numbers for each grid 
Table 7.13 Assumed parameters for the spatial variability example 
Parameter Value 
Drainage area, A (acres) 200 
Porosity, φ (%) 30 
Net pay thickness, h (ft) 200 
Total compressibility, ct (psi-1) 0.00005 
Oil viscosity, μ (cp) 0.8 
Initial reservoir pressure, Pini (psi) 2,500 
Designated wellbore pressure, Pwf (psi) 2,000 
Radius of wellbore, rw (ft) 0.5 
Oil formation volume factor, Bo (RB/STB) 1.0 
Shape factor, CA (-) 30.88 
Skin factor, s (-) 0 
Maximum production rate, qLim (bbl/day) 800 
Discount rate (%) 5 
Oil price ($/bbl) 30 
Facility cost ($ MM) 11 
Development cost ($ MM/well) 8 
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7.4.4 Decision Framework 
The decision variable in this example is the number of production wells located at 
Grid 6.  There are three decision alternatives: abandon this reservoir (no well), place 1 
well, and place 2 wells.  Net profit is calculated by subtracting facility and well cost 
from the profit from oil recovery.  Oil recovery is from the simple reservoir simulator 
described in Section 7.4.2.  With these three decision components, the decision tree for 
this example is shown in Figure 7.39. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.39 Decision tree for the spatial variability example 
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7.4.5 Non-Informative Prior Probabilities 
The spatial variability example has three possible preferred outcomes - A1>, A2>, 
and A3> - where Ai represents Alternative i.  The decision-based non-informative 
probabilities are summarized with marginal and joint PMFs in Figures 7.39 and 7.40.  
Comparing the PMFs from the principle of insufficient reason, one can see some of states 
of nature have more weight by the decision-based method. 
The PMFs in Figures 7.39 and 7.40 illustrate that the relationship between 
variables is highly non-linear and complicated.  The spatial relationship in 
permeabilities captured by decision-based priors is not Gaussian or lognormal, the 
probability distributions that are generally assumed when a decision is made in practice. 
The reason for the decision-based non-informative prior probabilities can be 
explained by the distribution of the number of states of nature, as shown in Table 7.14.  
The event k6=2 (md) includes two preference outcomes, A2> and A3>.  The contribution 
of the preference outcome, A2>, on the event, k6=2 (md), is equal to 
8,196,725/(8,196,725+14,348,907)=0.364, because the probability of ⅓ assigned to A2> 
is distributed to each possible value of k6 in proportion to the number of states of nature.  
In the same manner, the contribution of A3> on k6=2 (md) is ⅓.  As a result, the 
decision-based non-informative prior probability of k6=2 (md) equal to 
⅓×(0.364+1)=0.455.  The other contribution of A2>, which is equal to (1-0.364) goes to 
the probability that k6=4 (md).  The non-informative prior probability of k6=4 (md) is 
equal to ⅓×(1-0.364)=0.212.  Because the preference outcome, A1>, happens only when 
k6=8 (md), the non-decision-based non-informative probability that k6=8 (md) is equal to 
the probability assigned to the preference outcome, A1, which is ⅓. 
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While some pairs of k6 and preference outcome have dominance of the number of 
states of nature (Table 7.14), each pair of k2 and preference outcome has almost the same 
numbers of states of nature, as shown in Table 7.15.  The first preference outcome, A1>, 
has the same number of states of nature for three permeabilities - therefore, the 
contribution of A1> is the same.  The second, A2>, has fewer states of nature when k2 is 
small.  The contribution is small when k2 is small.  The opposite happens for A3>.  
The contribution of three preference outcomes makes the marginal PMF for k2, as shown 
in Figure 7.40. 
The same algorithm can be used for joint PMFs of decision-based non-
informative prior probabilities.  The distribution of the number of states of nature is 
shown in the table at the top of Figure 7.42.  The contribution of each preference 
outcomes is shown in the middle table.  The sum of contributions along a row should be 
equal to unity.  The non-informative prior probabilities of each bin is equal to the sum 
of the product of the probability of a preference outcome (in this case, ⅓, because there 
are three possible preference outcomes) and contribution of the preference outcome for a 
given bin.  For example, the non-informative prior probability for the first bin, k6 and k7 
are 2 (md), is equal to ⅓×0+⅓×0.0567+⅓×0.57=0.209.  As seen with this example, the 
probabilities on a bin of marginal or joint PMFs are affected by the distribution of the 
preference outcome in the original sample space (states of nature).   
The principle of insufficient reason and decision-based methods lead to different 
non-informative probabilities, different expected utilities for each alternative, and 
different values of perfect information.  However, the optimal decisions were the same 
for both methods in the example.  The expected utilities for both optimal decisions are 
not the same.  These results of decision analysis are summarized in Table 7.16. 
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 (a) The principle of insufficient reason (b) Decision-based method 
Figure 7.40 Marginal PMFs of the non-informative prior probability distribution for the 
spatial variability example 
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Figure 7.41 Joint PMFs of the non-informative prior probability distribution for the 
spatial variability example 
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Table 7.14 The number of states of nature corresponding to each pair of the preference 
outcome and possible values of the permeability at Grid 6 
   k6 (md)  
  2 4 8 
 A1> 0 0 14,348,907 
Preference Outcome A2> 8,196,725 14,348,907 0 
 A3> 6,152,182 0 0 
 
Table 7.15 The number of states of nature corresponding to each pair of the preference 
outcome and possible values of the permeability at Grid 2 
   k2 (md)  
  2 4 8 
 A1> 4,782,969 4,782,969 4,782,969 
Preference Outcome A2> 6,624,407 7,598,662 8,322,563 
 A3> 2,941,531 1,967,276 1,243,375 
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The number of corresponding states of nature 
[k6,k7] in md 
 
[2,2] [2,4] [2,8] [4,2] [4,4] [4,8] [8,2] [8,4] [8,8] 
A1> 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,782,969 4,782,969 4,782,969 
A2> 1,277,295 2,913,528 4,005,902 4,782,969 4,782,969 4,782,969 0 0 0 
A3> 3,505,674 1,869,441 777,067 0 0 0 0 0 0 
↓ 
The contribution of each preference outcome on 9 bins 
[k6,k7] in md 
 
[2,2] [2,4] [2,8] [4,2] [4,4] [4,8] [8,2] [8,4] [8,8] 
A1> 0 0 0 0 0 0 ⅓ ⅓ ⅓ 
A2> 0.0567 0.1292 0.1777 0.2121 0.2121 0.2121 0 0 0 
A3> 0.5700 0.3039 0.1263 0 0 0 0 0 0 
↓ 
Decision-based non-informative probabilities on 9 bins 
[k6,k7] in md 
 
[2,2] [2,4] [2,8] [4,2] [4,4] [4,8] [8,2] [8,4] [8,8] 
Prob. 0.209 0.144 0.101 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.111 0.111 0.111 
2
4
8
2
4
80
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
k6
k7  
Figure 7.42 Algorithm for establishing decision-based non-informative prior probabilities 
on the sample space of [k6, k7] 
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Table 7.16 Decision analysis results 
  
The Principle of 
Insufficient Reason 
Decision-Based 
Method 
A1 $9,229,036 $7,888,369 
A2 $10,348,773 $8,818,215 Expected Utility 
A3 $0 $0 
Optimal Decision  A2 A2 
Value of Perfect Information  $419,716 $514,428 
 
7.4.6 Non-Informative Prior Probabilities from Different Decision Frameworks 
The previous chapter showed that a change in decision framework may change 
non-informative prior probabilities, even when the states of nature are the same.  
Possible changes in decision framework include adding or removing decision 
alternative(s), using different values for deterministic parameters, or using different 
consequence functions that potentially change preference outcomes by modifying entries 
in the decision matrix. 
If the “No go” decision alternative, A3, is removed from the set of possible 
decision alternatives, the possible preference outcomes are A1> and A2>.  The removal 
of one decision alternative leads to a large difference in decision-based non-informative 
prior probabilities.  The non-informative prior probabilities for both decision making 
problems are shown in Figures 7.42 and 7.43. 
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 (a) Three decision alternatives (b) Two decision alternatives 
Figure 7.43 Marginal PMFs of the decision-based non-informative prior probabilities for 
the spatial variability examples with 2 and 3 alternatives 
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Figure 7.44 Joint PMFs of the decision-based non-informative prior probabilities for the 
spatial variability examples with 2 and 3 decision alternatives 
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The decision analysis results for the principle of insufficient reason and the 
decision-based methods are summarized in Table 7.17.  Due to different probabilities, 
both methods provide different expected utilities and values of perfect information for the 
two decision alternatives.  The optimal decision is the same, but the same optimal 
decision is not able to be generalized.  Comparing this result with that for three decision 
alternatives in Table 7.17, the decision-based method yields different expected utilities 
and VPIs while the principle of insufficient reason yields only different VPIs.  Because 
the principle of insufficient reason provides the same probabilities for the three- and two-
decision-alternative cases, the expected utilities should be the same.  However, VPIs 
may be different because of the way VPI is quantified.  VPI is equal to the sum of 
P(Si)×{Max(Utility(A1|Si), Utility(A2|Si), Utility(A3|Si))−Utility(A2|Si)} (i=1,…,the total 
number of states of nature) for decision making with three alternatives, and of 
P(Si)×Max(Utility(A1|Si), Utility(A2|Si))−Utility(A2|Si) for decision making with two 
alternatives.  If there exists a state of nature that has A3 as the most preferred decision 
alternative, the value for Max() may be different for two decision frameworks and VPI 
may differ from each other.  In addition, if A3 is always the least preferred for all states 
of nature, the VPI when based on the principle of insufficient reason should be the same 
for both decision frameworks. 
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Table 7.17 Decision analysis results for the spatial variability example with two decision 
alternatives 
  
The Principle of 
Insufficient Reason 
Decision-Based Method 
A1 $9,229,036 $12,036,102 
Expected Utility 
A2 $10,348,773 $12,614,435 
Optimal Decision  A2 A2 
Value of Perfect Information  $348,628 $522,941 
 
7.4.7 Summary 
The spatial variability example showed the difference in non-informative 
probabilities given by the principle of insufficient reason and decision-based methods in 
Figures 7.40 and 7.41.  The marginal and joint PMFs from the decision-based non-
informative prior were not uniform.  This means that the uniform probability 
distribution based on the principle of insufficient reason may produce an unbiased 
starting point for decision making.  In other words, maximum uncertainty in states of 
nature may not provide maximum uncertainty in decision outcomes.  This example 
supports the point made by Journel and Deutsch (1993). 
It was shown in Figures 7.41 and 7.42 that different sets of decision alternatives 
may have different decision-based non-informative priors. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions and Recommendation 
This dissertation proposed a new method to establish a non-informative prior 
probability distribution for decision analysis.  The principle of insufficient reason for the 
probability distribution under complete ignorance was reviewed and discussed, 
highlighting three difficulties: bias in decision alternatives, inconsistency, and theoretical 
unsoundness.  The next step was to introduce a decision-based method and discuss the 
logic and rationality in the decision-based method.  This step supports the hypothesis 
that the decision-based method provides a rational, consistent, and theoretically sound 
non-informative prior probability distribution.  Three decision making examples in 
engineering practice demonstrated the practical implications of the method for decision-
based priors.   
  
8.1 LOGICAL AND RATIONAL BASIS OF DECISION-BASED METHOD 
The decision-based method provides a rational starting point for decision making.  
The principle of insufficient reason assigns the same probabilities to each state of nature 
on the basis of randomness in states of nature.  However, under complete ignorance a 
decision maker behaves as if the decision outcomes are random.   The decision-based 
method is based on the concept of random choice and balances decision outcomes that 
include both of the preference in decision alternatives and the decision consequences. 
The decision-based method provides consistent non-informative prior 
probabilities, while the principle of insufficient reason fails to provide a consistent 
probability distribution.  This inconsistency has been a major issue in defining prior 
probability distributions for Bayes’ theorem, but there has been no unique answer for it.  
The decision-based method provides an objective method to define the sample space 
 171
where the principle of insufficient reason should be applied to.  The resultant non-
informative probabilities are uniquely established for a given decision framework. 
The decision-based method provides a theoretical satisfaction to decision theory.  
There are several axioms in decision theory made from the economic behavior of a 
rational person.  While the principle of insufficient reason fails to satisfy the axioms 
regarding decision making under complete ignorance, the decision-based method works 
successfully. 
 
8.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION-BASED METHOD 
The decision-based method provides an objective way to represent the uncertainty 
for decision making under complete ignorance.  The process is deterministic because 
decision makers do not need to provide subjective information on probabilities.  The 
method is applicable to both continuous and discrete random variables. 
Decision-based non-informative prior probabilities capture a highly non-linear 
and complex relationship between input variables.  In some decision making problems, 
the decision-based method weights the extreme state of nature that may be driving a 
decision. 
Non-informative probabilities for a decision making problem may be different 
from those for another decision making with the same set of states of nature.  The 
reason for different non-informative probabilities is that the two decision making 
problems may have different preference outcomes that the decision-based method is 
based on.  This difference affects the expected utilities for decision alternatives, optimal 
decisions, and value of perfect information. 
The decision-based method can be applied with the algorithm provided in this 
study.  The algorithm is straightforward and requires only a decision matrix as an input.  
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The computer coded algorithm of the decision-based method is also provided in this 
study.  The algorithm is capable of working for practical decision making with a number 
of decision alternatives and states of nature as illustrated with practical decision 
examples. 
 
8.3 RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE WORK 
It is recommended that rational likelihood functions should be developed because 
the rational decision making requires not only a rational starting point for decision 
making, but also a rational likelihood function in Bayesian decision analysis.  The 
realistic and reasonable likelihood function is made from and calibrated with the 
information, for example, field investigation, laboratory test, and experts’ opinion.  
Because the information is vague and from various sources, to establish a reasonable 
method to build likelihood functions is challenging.  The likelihood functions should 
include no more than is actually contained in the information.  Therefore, the arbitrary 
use of mathematically convenient probability density functions may under-represent the 
uncertainty involved in decision making.  The likelihood functions in Section 7.3.7 
would be a good example for the least biased interpretation of information.  The 
calibrated likelihood functions would provide a rational way to assess the value of 
information and the value of perfect information. 
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Appendices 
 
APPENDIX A. HISTORY MATCHING FOR HOLSTEIN OIL FIELD 
History matching was performed for the oil production from the BP-operated 
Holstein field.  The goal of the history matching was to estimate model flow parameters 
from the production history provided by the Minerals Management Service (2008).  The 
model parameters, such as productivity index, decay constant, the difference between 
initial reservoir pressure and wellbore pressure, and transmissibility between two 
reservoir units, are for the simple reservoir simulator described in Section 7.3.2.  The 
optimal match was found by minimizing the sum of least squared error.  The 
optimization was performed by Microsoft Excel Solver. 
There are twelve production wells in the Holstein field, as shown in Figure A.1.  
The first task was to select the wells to be used in history matching.  For the selection 
purpose, the history matching was performed with individual wells and the results are 
shown in Table A.1.  Based on the result and the location of wells, the wells are grouped 
into 4, as shown in Table A.2.  Groups 2, 3, and 4 were eliminated from detailed history 
matching with the modified tank-model.  The wells in the middle latitude, A007, A009, 
A011, and A015, (Group 2) are excluded because they have very low productivity 
indices.  Group 3 has the wells in the lower latitude, A010 and A012, located far from 
the others and show large productivity indices.  A004 in Group 4 was not included 
because the production period was short and the productivity index is smaller that the 
others.  The history matching was conducted with the rest of production wells in Group 
1, A002, A003, A005, A006, and A013. 
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Table A.1 Summary of history matching results for individual production wells 
 Well ID 
Productivity 
Index 
Drainage 
Area 
Initial Average Reservoir 
Pressure 
  (bbl/psi/day) (acres) (psi) 
 A002 5.2 312 4,358 
 A003 6.9 116 3,883 
Group 1 A005 4.3 77 5,539 
 A006 5.5 81 5,162 
 A013 3.8 157 4,678 
A007 2.9 46 3,176 
A009 2.2 18 2,304 
A011 1.1 2 6,236 
Group 2 
A015 0.3 200 8,970 
A010 11.8 200 4,550 
Group 3 
A012 7.1 200 3,949 
Group 4 A004 0.1 200 41,880 
 
Table A.2 Summary of history matching results for categorized production wells 
Group Well ID 
Productivity 
Index 
Drainage 
Area 
Initial Average 
Reservoir 
Pressure 
  (bbl/psi/day) (acres) (psi) 
Group 1 A002, A003, A005, A006, A013 3.8-6.9 81-312 3,883-5,639 
Group 2 A007, A009, A011, A015 0.3-2.9 46 2,304-8,970 
Group 3 A010, A012 7.1, 11.8 200 3,949, 4,550 
Group 4 A004 0.1 200 8,970 
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Figure A.1 Reservoir depositional elements map (Wiseman et al., 2007) 
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Figure A.2 Oil production history for each well in Holstein field 
 
History matching was performed with the modified version of Tank model.  The 
model is able to simulate the pressure and production rate histories for two reservoir units 
with communication.  Because the production model is limited to two units, the history 
matching was performed for each pair combination from the five production wells.  This 
approach reduces the degree of freedom, but produces a different set of model parameters 
for each pair.  For example, the productivity index for A002 is 12 (bbl/psi/day) when 
coupled with A005 but 14 (bbl/psi/day) with A013.  This non-uniqueness can be 
observed in the other pairs in Table A.3.  The oil production curves from the MMS 
database and the optimal match are shown in Figures A.3 through A.10. 
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Table A.3 Summary of history matching results for coupled production wells 
Well 
ID 
Pair 
Productivity 
Index, J 
Drainage 
Area, A 
Transmissibility, 
T 
Initial 
Pressure 
Difference, 
ΔPini 
 
  (bbl/psi/day) (acres) (bbl/psi/day) (psi)  
With A005 14 55 7×107 3085  
A002 
With A013 12 63 0.6 3100  
With A002 11 68 7×107 3085  
With A013 18 84 100 2809 partly-matched 
With A003 26 45 60 2575  
A005 
With A006 26 183 60 2572  
With A002 10 100 0.6 3100  
With A005 25 100 100 2809 partly-matched 
With A006 8 100 3 3338  
A013 
With A003 8 97 3 3375  
With A005 11 28 60 2575  
With A013 24 187 3 3375  A003 
With A006 13 137 25 3650  
With A005 49 41 60 2572  
With A013 15 37 3 3338  A006 
With A003 14 60 25 3650  
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Figure A.3 History matching results: A002 and A005 
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Figure A.4 History matching results: A002 and A013 
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Figure A.5 History matching results: A003 and A005 
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Figure A.6 History matching results: A003 and A006 
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Figure A.7 History matching results: A003 and A013 
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Figure A.8 History matching results: A005 and A006 
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Figure A.9 History matching results: A005 and A013 
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Figure A.10 History matching results: A006 and A013 
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The history matching results illustrate the difficulties in obtaining the structure of 
porous media.  The first evidence is a large variation in production histories of the wells 
in the same geologic structure.  The reservoir depositional map in Figure A.1 indicates 
that the wells, A002, A003, A005, A006, A007, A011, A013, and A015 are in the same 
channel.  However, well performance varies significantly.  These wells can be 
analyzed in groups, one with wells A002, A003, A005, and A006, and the other 
consisting of wells, A007, A011, and A015.  The former group has a higher production 
rate than the latter group, as shown in Figure A.2.  The second evidence is the variation 
of back-calculated transmissibility values.  The back-calculated transmissibilities 
between each pair of production wells might not correlate with pre-determined geologic 
structure, as shown in Figure A.11.  For example, A002 and A005 are located in two 
different geologic structures, but history matching yields an extremely large value of 
transmissibility between the two wells.  The large transmissibility implies that the 
geologic discontinuity between the two wells may not exist.  Another example is that 
A002 and A013 are considered to be at the same channel, but the small transmissibility 
between them indicates low connectivity.  These two evidences of a significant 
difference in well performance and geologic interpretation illustrate the difficulties in 
interpreting the heterogeneous porous media. 
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Figure A.11 Back-calculated transmissibility based on real performance 
 
History matching helped to verify the possible overestimation of physical 
parameters, such as permeability and net pay of the reservoir.  Suppose the wells in 
Group 2 with small production rates behave ideally.  In this ideal condition, each of the 
production wells, A007, A009, A011, and A015, would have the same production history 
as A002, which has one of the largest oil recoveries through Holstein’s production life so 
far.  This assumption is reasonable because a decision maker who designs the well 
location may locate production wells as the oil production from each well is not 
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interfered one another.  This concept of no interference is equivalent to the isolated 
wells. 
Oil production histories for the idealized Holstein are shown in Figures A.12 and 
A.13.  Considering the design capacity of Holstein, 110,000 bbl/day (3,300,000 
bbl/month) (BP America, 2008), the result based on the assumption still gives a much 
lower production rate.  This means that the match between expected and real behavior is 
not completed only by making low production wells idealized.  If the sum of the 
maximum performance of individual wells does not work, the alternative is to increase 
maximum performance by increasing physical parameters such as permeability and net 
pay.  This illustrates the difficulties in characterizing heterogeneous porous media.  
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Figure A.12 Monthly oil production for the idealized Holstein oil field 
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Figure A.13 Cumulative oil production of the idealized Holstein oil field 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 190
APPENDIX B. CODE OF THE ALGORITHM FOR DECISION-BASED NON-INFORMATIVE 
PRIOR PROBABILITIES 
The subroutine, noninfo_pmf(), is based on Microsoft Excel Visual Basic 
Application (VBA) and works for discrete probability distributions.  It requires the 
number of decision alternatives (num_alt), the number of states of nature (num_states), 
and a decision matrix (decision_matrix) as inputs for the algorithm.  The decision matrix 
is assumed to be located in an Excel sheet named “decision_matrix”.  The product of 
this algorithm, non-informative prior probabilities, will be given in the sheet named 
“noninfoPMF”.  This code also requires the two sheets named “temp_sorting” and 
“temp_sorting2” for the purpose of sorting decision alternatives. 
The calculation time of the Excel VBA algorithm is shown in Figure B.1.  The 
calculation was performed with a personal computer with 2.4GHz CPU and 3.25 Gb 
RAM.  It is assumed that the numbers of the decision alternatives and the states of 
nature are equal to each other.  The consequences in a decision matrix were generated 
by a random number generator in Excel.  For example, it took 30 minutes for obtaining 
a decision-based non-informative prior for a decision matrix with 2000 decision 
alternatives and 2000 states of nature (4,000,000 entries in the decision matrix). 
The calculation time for practical decision making would be less than the time 
took for a decision matrix with random numbers when the numbers of decision 
alternatives and states of nature are the same for both decision making problems.  The 
reason for this estimation is that a practical decision making problem may have a 
structure in decision outcomes such as the most preferred decision alternatives and the 
decision consequences.  The difference may reduce the number of preference outcomes, 
and accordingly, the time for comparing process (this algorithm is based on a simple one-
to-one comparison when finding the identical decision outcomes). 
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Figure B.1 Calculation time of the algorithm 
 
Sub noninfo_pmf() 
 
'Objectives: Assigning noninformative PMF 
'Input: num_alt , num_states, Decision matrix in the Excel sheet, "Decision_matrix" 
'Output: Decision-based non-informative prior probabilities in the Excel sheet, "noninfoPMF" 
'Last update: July 19, 2008 
'by Namhong Min 
 
num_alt = 2000 
num_states = 2000 
 
ReDim decision_matrix(num_alt, num_states) 
 
'################################################################################################### 
'1 Read decision matrix 
'################################################################################################### 
For i = 1 To num_states 
    For j = 1 To num_alt 
        decision_matrix(j, i) = Sheets("Decision_matrix").Cells(2 + j, 2 + i) 
    Next j 
Next i 
'################################################################################################### 
'2 Lump duplicate columns 
'################################################################################################### 
ReDim temp_lump(num_alt, num_states) 
ReDim decision_matrix_dup_index(num_states) 
ReDim temp_decision_matrix_dup_cnt(num_states) 
 
For j = 1 To num_alt 
    temp_lump(j, 1) = decision_matrix(j, 1) 
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Next j 
cnt_lumped = 1 
decision_matrix_dup_index(1) = 1 
temp_decision_matrix_dup_cnt(1) = 1 
 
For i = 2 To num_states 
    cnt_within_tol = 0 
    k = 0 
    switch_match = 0 
    Do While k < cnt_lumped And switch_match = 0 
        k = k + 1 
        switch_tol1 = 1 
        cnt_alt = 1 
 
        Do While switch_tol1 = 1 And cnt_alt <= num_alt 
            If Abs(decision_matrix(cnt_alt, i) - temp_lump(cnt_alt, k)) > 0 Then 
                switch_tol1 = 0 
            Else 
                cnt_alt = cnt_alt + 1 
            End If 
        Loop 
        If cnt_alt = (num_alt + 1) And switch_tol1 = 1 Then 
            switch_match = 1 
            decision_matrix_dup_index(i) = k 
            temp_decision_matrix_dup_cnt(k) = temp_decision_matrix_dup_cnt(k) + 1 
        End If 
    Loop 
    If k = cnt_lumped And switch_tol1 = 0 Then 
        cnt_lumped = cnt_lumped + 1 
        For j = 1 To num_alt 
            temp_lump(j, cnt_lumped) = decision_matrix(j, i) 
        Next j 
        decision_matrix_dup_index(i) = cnt_lumped 
        temp_decision_matrix_dup_cnt(cnt_lumped) = 1 
    End If 
Next i 
 
num_lumped = cnt_lumped 
 
ReDim decision_matrix_dup(num_alt, num_lumped) 
ReDim decision_matrix_dup_cnt(num_lumped) 
For i = 1 To num_lumped 
        decision_matrix_dup_cnt(i) = temp_decision_matrix_dup_cnt(i) 
    For j = 1 To num_alt 
        decision_matrix_dup(j, i) = temp_lump(j, i) 
    Next j 
Next i 
 
'################################################################################################### 
'3 Build decision outcome matrix: Store the most preferred decision alternative(s) & its consequence 
'################################################################################################### 
ReDim decision_outcome(num_alt, num_lumped) 
 
Sheets("temp_sorting").Select 
    Cells.Select 
    Selection.ClearContents 
cnt_equal = 0 
switch_equal_pref = 0 
ReDim equal_pref_lumped(num_lumped) 'storage for the # of lumped scenario which has an equal preference 
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For i = 1 To num_lumped 
    switch_pref_outcome = 0 
    For j = 1 To num_alt 
        Sheets("temp_sorting").Cells(j, 1) = j 
        Sheets("temp_sorting").Cells(j, 2) = decision_matrix_dup(j, i) 
    Next j 
    Columns("A:B").Select 
    Selection.Sort Key1:=Range("B1"), Order1:=xlDescending, Header:=xlGuess, _ 
        OrderCustom:=1, MatchCase:=False, Orientation:=xlTopToBottom, _ 
        DataOption1:=xlSortNormal 
    Calculate 
    decision_outcome(0, i) = Sheets("temp_sorting").Cells(1, 2) 
    j = 1 
    Do While switch_pref_outcome = 0 And j < num_alt 
        decision_outcome(j, i) = Sheets("temp_sorting").Cells(j, 1) 
        If (Sheets("temp_sorting").Cells(j, 2) - Sheets("temp_sorting").Cells(j + 1, 2)) > 0 Then 
            decision_outcome(j + 1, i) = 0 
            switch_pref_outcome = 1 
        ElseIf (Sheets("temp_sorting").Cells(j, 2) - Sheets("temp_sorting").Cells(j + 1, 2)) <= 0 Then 
            j = j + 1 
        End If 
    Loop 
     
    If switch_pref_outcome <> 1 Then 
        decision_outcome(num_alt, i) = Sheets("temp_sorting").Cells(num_alt, 1) 
    End If 
    If j > 1 Then 
        For hhh = 1 To j 
            Sheets("temp_sorting2").Cells(hhh, 1) = decision_outcome(hhh, i) 
        Next hhh 
        Sheets("temp_sorting2").Select 
        Columns("A:A").Select 
        Selection.Sort Key1:=Range("A1"), Order1:=xlAscending, Header:=xlGuess, _ 
            OrderCustom:=1, MatchCase:=False, Orientation:=xlTopToBottom, _ 
            DataOption1:=xlSortNormal 
        Calculate 
        For hhh = 1 To j 
            decision_outcome(hhh, i) = Sheets("temp_sorting2").Cells(hhh, 1) 
        Next hhh 
         
    End If 
    Sheets("temp_sorting").Select 
Next i 
 
'################################################################################################### 
'4 Lump duplicated column in decision outcome matrix 
'################################################################################################### 
ReDim decision_outcome_dup_index(num_lumped) 
ReDim temp_decision_outcome_dup(num_alt, num_lumped) 
ReDim temp_decision_outcome_dup_cnt(num_lumped) 
 
temp_decision_outcome_dup(0, 1) = 0 '1 
For j = 0 To num_alt 
    temp_decision_outcome_dup(j, 1) = decision_outcome(j, 1) 
Next j 
decision_outcome_dup_index(1) = 1 
temp_decision_outcome_dup_cnt(1) = 1 
num_decision_outcomes = 1 
num_preference_outcomes = 1 
For i = 2 To num_lumped 
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    switch_new = 1 
    switch_new_preference = 1 
    For k = 1 To num_decision_outcomes 
        switch_iden = 0 
        switch_iden_preference = 0 
        For j = 0 To num_alt 
            If decision_outcome(j, i) = temp_decision_outcome_dup(j, k) Then 
                switch_iden = switch_iden + 1 
                If j <> 0 Then 
                    switch_iden_preference = switch_iden_preference + 1 
                End If 
            End If 
        Next j 
        If switch_iden = num_alt + 1 Then 
            temp_decision_outcome_dup_cnt(k) = temp_decision_outcome_dup_cnt(k) + 1 
            decision_outcome_dup_index(i) = k 
            switch_new = 0 
        End If 
         
        If switch_iden_preference = num_alt Then 
            switch_new_preference = 0 
        End If 
    Next k 
    If switch_new = 1 Then 
        num_decision_outcomes = num_decision_outcomes + 1 
        temp_decision_outcome_dup_cnt(num_decision_outcomes) = 1 
        For j = 0 To num_alt 
            temp_decision_outcome_dup(j, num_decision_outcomes) = decision_outcome(j, i) 
        Next j 
        decision_outcome_dup_index(i) = num_decision_outcomes 
    End If 
    If switch_new_preference = 1 Then 
        num_preference_outcomes = num_preference_outcomes + 1 
    End If 
Next i 
 
ReDim decision_outcome_dup_cnt(num_decision_outcomes) 
ReDim decision_outcome_dup(num_alt, num_decision_outcomes) 
For i = 1 To num_decision_outcomes 
    decision_outcome_dup_cnt(i) = temp_decision_outcome_dup_cnt(i) 
    For j = 0 To num_alt 
        decision_outcome_dup(j, i) = temp_decision_outcome_dup(j, i) 
    Next j 
Next i 
 
'################################################################################################### 
'5 Build preference outcomes 
'################################################################################################### 
ReDim preference_outcome_index(num_decision_outcomes) 
ReDim preference_outcome(num_alt, num_preference_outcomes) 
ReDim preference_outcome_cnt(num_preference_outcomes) 
preference_outcome(0, 1) = 0 '1 
For j = 1 To num_alt 
    preference_outcome(j, 1) = decision_outcome_dup(j, 1) 
Next j 
preference_outcome_index(1) = 1 
preference_outcome_cnt(1) = 1 
num_preference_outcomes = 1 
 
For i = 2 To num_decision_outcomes 
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    switch_new = 1 
    For k = 1 To num_preference_outcomes 
        switch_iden = 0 
        For j = 1 To num_alt 
            If decision_outcome_dup(j, i) = preference_outcome(j, k) Then 
                switch_iden = switch_iden + 1 
            End If 
        Next j 
        If switch_iden = num_alt Then 
            preference_outcome_cnt(k) = preference_outcome_cnt(k) + 1 
            preference_outcome_index(i) = k 
            switch_new = 0 
        End If 
    Next k 
    If switch_new = 1 Then 
        num_preference_outcomes = num_preference_outcomes + 1 
        preference_outcome_cnt(num_preference_outcomes) = 1 
        For j = 1 To num_alt 
            preference_outcome(j, num_preference_outcomes) = decision_outcome_dup(j, i) 
        Next j 
        preference_outcome_index(i) = num_preference_outcomes 
    End If 
Next i 
 
'################################################################################################### 
'6 Assigning the noninformative prior probability distribution on lumped scenarios 
'################################################################################################### 
ReDim pmf_denominator(num_states) 
For i = 1 To num_states 
    pmf_denominator(i) = num_preference_outcomes 
    pmf_denominator(i) = pmf_denominator(i) * decision_matrix_dup_cnt(decision_matrix_dup_index(i)) 
    pmf_denominator(i) = pmf_denominator(i)_ 
_decision_outcome_dup_cnt(decision_outcome_dup_index(decision_matrix_dup_index(i))) 
    pmf_denominator(i) = pmf_denominator(i)_ 
_*preference_outcome_cnt(preference_outcome_index(decision_outcome_dup_index(decision_matrix_dup_index(i)))) 
Next i 
 
ReDim pmf(num_states) 
temp_pmf_sum = 0 
For i = 1 To num_states 
    pmf(i) = 1 / pmf_denominator(i) 
    temp_pmf_sum = temp_pmf_sum + pmf(i) 
Next i 
'Print 
    Sheets("noninfoPMF").Select 
    Columns("A:F").Select 
    Selection.ClearContents 
Sheets("noninfoPMF").Cells(1, 1) = "States of Nature" 
Sheets("noninfoPMF").Cells(1, 2) = "Denominator" 
Sheets("noninfoPMF").Cells(1, 3) = "Non-informative prior probabilities" 
For i = 1 To num_states 
    Sheets("noninfoPMF").Cells(i + 1, 1) = "S" & i 
    Sheets("noninfoPMF").Cells(i + 1, 2) = pmf_denominator(i) 
    Sheets("noninfoPMF").Cells(i + 1, 3) = pmf(i) 
Next i 
    Sheets("noninfoPMF").Cells(1, 5) = "Error in PMF_SUM=" 
    Sheets("noninfoPMF").Cells(1, 6) = (1 - temp_pmf_sum) 
End Sub 
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APPENDIX C. MATHEMATICAL DERIVATION OF MODIFIED TANK MODEL 
The single-phase fluid flow from two units, as shown in Figure C.1, is modeled 
with a tank-type model.  The model includes a possible connectivity between two units 
(tanks) with a cross flow rate, qXF.   
 
 
Figure C.1 Flow domain for a tank-type model 
 
The basic equations for modeling the flow include a continuity equation and Darcy’s law.  
These equations, shown in Equations C.1 through C.4, are applied to each unit.  
 
( )XF11t1P1 qqdt
PdcV −−=  (C.1) 
( )XF22t2P2 qqdt
PdcV +−=  (C.2) 
( )wf1111 PPJq −=  (C.3) 
( )wf2222 PPJq −=  (C.4) 
 
q1
q2
qXF
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where Vp is the pore volume, ct is the total compressibility, P  is the average reservoir 
pressure, t is time, q is flow rate, J is the productivity index, and Pwf is the wellbore 
pressure.  
These four equations can be expressed with the following three equations. 
 
( ) XFwf1111t1P1 qPPJdtPdcV +−−=  (C.5) 
( ) XFwf2222t2P2 qPPJdtPdcV −−−=  (C.6) 
( )12XF PPTq −=  (C.7) 
where T is transmissibility, which quantifies the degree of connectivity between two 
units.  Guillot (1999) developed an analytical solution these equations (Case 1).  In this 
study, the extension of his model is developed in Case 2. 
 
Case 1: No limit on total production rate, q1+q2 
If there is no limit on the peak production rate, wellbore pressures, Pwf1 and Pwf2 
are constant with time.  By substituting Equations C.7 into Equations C.5 and C.6, the 
equations can be expressed in a matrix form.  
 
( )
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 (C.8)
 
Here, we end up with a system of nonhomogeneous first-order ordinary differential 
equations (ODE) with an initial condition, which can be generalized: 
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fˆXˆAˆXˆ +=′  (C.9)
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and an initial condition that is  ( )( )⎥⎦
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For flexibility in application of the resultant equations, the initial reservoir pressures for 
both compartments assumed to be unequal. 
The solution of this ODE begins with obtaining eigenvalues.  From the 
determinant in Equation C.10, two eigenvalues and eigenvectors can be calculated, as 
shown in Equations C.11 and C.12. 
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The term in square root in Equation C.11 is always greater than or equal to zero because 
it consists of two terms that are greater that or equal to zero.  If there is no connectivity 
between two units (T=0) and J1/Vp1/ct1 is equal to J2/Vp2/ct2, the eigenvalues are identical 
to each other.  In this case, this eigenvalue approach does not work because the matrix, 
Aˆ , is already a diagonal matrix.  The solution for the case is simply two separated tank 
models.  In the other cases with the term in square root in Equation C.11 greater than 
zero, there exists two different eigenvalues and following approach is valid.  With the 
eigenvalues, a diagonal matrix, Λˆ can be built.  The Pˆ  matrix consists of the 
eigenvectors as in Equation C.14. 
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Multiplying the inverse matrix of Pˆ  on both sides in Equation C.9,  
 
fˆPˆXˆAˆPˆXˆPˆ 111 −−− +=′  (C.15)
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Let YˆPˆXˆ =  ( YˆPˆXˆ ′=′ ). 
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Equation C.17 is converted into two simultaneous ODEs, as shown in Equation C.19. 
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For convenience, the constant terms are symbolized as A and B. 
 
Ayλ
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Solutions for these equations are 
Particular1,sHomogeneou1,1 yyy +=  (C.24)
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Because YˆPˆXˆ = , 
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From the initial conditions on average reservoir pressure,  
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From the solution with the same initial average reservoir pressure in both units, cross 
flow rate, production rate, and oil recovery for each unit can be calculated. 
 ( )12XF PPTq −=  
( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
2
tλ
22t1p11
1
tλ
11t1p11 λ
BeCλcVJ
λ
AeCλcVJ 21  (C.35)
( )wf1111 PPJq −= ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−+= wf1
21
tλ
2
tλ
11 Pλ
B
λ
AeCeCJ 21  (C.36)
 203
( )
⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +++
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++
=
−=
wf2
2
tλ
2
2t1p11
1
tλ
1
1t1p11
2
wf2222
P
λ
BeC
T
λcVTJ
λ
AeC
T
λcVTJ
J
PPJq
2
1
 (C.37)
 
Oil recovery from the time, t1 to the time t2, can be calculated by integrating the 
equations for the production rate, which is given by the Equations, C.36 and C.37.  The 
oil recovery from each unit, R1 and R2, is given in following equations.   
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Case 2 Limit on total production rate, q1+q2 
When flow rate is limited, the wellbore pressure is also a function of time.  
Therefore, the basic equations, Equations C.5, C.6, and C.7, must be solved differently.  
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It is assumed that borehole pressure difference remains the same (Pwf1=Pwf2+ΔPwf). 
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The governing equations can be expressed as follows. 
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The initial conditions are identical to Case 1.  The solution for Case 2 can be derived in 
the same way as Case 1.  However, Case 2 always has two different eigenvalues 
because the determinant in Equation C.46 is equal to zero only if all J1, J2 and T are equal 
to zero, which is physically meaningless.  The two eigenvalues are shown in Equations 
C.47 through C.49. 
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APPENDIX D. CODE OF THE FLOW SIMULATOR USED FOR THE SPATIAL 
VARIABILITY EXAMPLE 
The code below was used to simulate a one phase flow in 4 by 4 grid flow 
domain, shown in Section 7.4.2.  The calculation is straightforward because the code is 
implicit and makes use of only matrix inversion and multiplication.  Results of the 
simulator include histories of reservoir pressure (pressure at each grid) and wellbore 
pressure, and total recovery from production well(s).  For convenience in economic 
analysis possibly following the reservoir simulation, the discount factor is multiplied to 
oil recovery. 
 
clear all; 
poro=0.3; 
ct=0.00000000725;   % (1/Pa) 
mu=0.0008;   % (Pa sec) 
skin=0;    %(-) 
pini=(2200)*(1000/0.1450);   % initial pressure in N/m^2, ()in psi 
pwf=(2000)*(1000/0.1450);   % wellbore pressure in N/m^2, ()in psi 
delt=1*60*60*24*5;    % time increment in sec 
end_t=1*60*60*24*365*20;  % total production period 
delz=(300)*0.3048;    % net pay, height of cubics in m, () in ft 
grid_area=(200)*4046.8/(16);   %Area for one grid in m^2, (A_total) in acres, (N)#of grids 
vb=grid_area*(delz);   %bulk volume of ONE GRID in m^3,  (h) in ft 
ca=30.88;    %at the center of a rectangular grid 
qlim=(1000)*1/6.289/24/60/60;   %production rate limit, m^3/sec () in STB/Day 
disc_rate=0.05;    % discount rate 
k(1)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001);  % m^2, 1 (md)=9.8692*10^-16 (m^2) 
k(2)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(3)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(4)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(5)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(6)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(7)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(8)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(9)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(10)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(11)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(12)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(13)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(14)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(15)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
k(16)=(2)*(9.8692*0.0000000000000001); 
well_loc=6;   % the grid where production wells are located  
num_well=1;   % the number of wells 
 
temp_oil_rcvry=zeros(0,1); 
recovery=zeros(3,3); 
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bbb=zeros(16,16); 
p_hist=pini*ones(16,1); 
Trans=zeros(16,16); 
inv_trans=zeros(16,16); 
Trans(1,1)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(1)+1/k(2))+1/(1/k(1)+1/k(5))); 
Trans(1,2)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(1)+1/k(2))); 
Trans(1,5)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(1)+1/k(5))); 
Trans(2,1)=Trans(1,2); 
Trans(2,2)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(2)+1/k(1))+1/(1/k(2)+1/k(3))+1/(1/k(2)+1/k(6))); 
Trans(2,3)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(2)+1/k(3))); 
Trans(2,6)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(2)+1/k(6))); 
Trans(3,2)=Trans(2,3); 
Trans(3,3)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(3)+1/k(2))+1/(1/k(3)+1/k(4))+1/(1/k(3)+1/k(7))); 
Trans(3,4)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(3)+1/k(4))); 
Trans(3,7)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(3)+1/k(7))); 
Trans(4,3)=Trans(3,4); 
Trans(4,4)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(4)+1/k(3))+1/(1/k(4)+1/k(8))); 
Trans(4,8)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(4)+1/k(8))); 
Trans(5,1)=Trans(1,5); 
Trans(5,5)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(5)+1/k(1))+1/(1/k(5)+1/k(6))+1/(1/k(5)+1/k(9))); 
Trans(5,6)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(5)+1/k(6))); 
Trans(5,9)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(5)+1/k(9))); 
Trans(6,2)=Trans(2,6); 
Trans(6,5)=Trans(5,6); 
Trans(6,6)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(6)+1/k(2))+1/(1/k(6)+1/k(5))+1/(1/k(6)+1/k(7))+1/(1/k(6)+1/k(10))); 
Trans(6,7)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(6)+1/k(7))); 
Trans(6,10)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(6)+1/k(10))); 
Trans(7,3)=Trans(3,7); 
Trans(7,6)=Trans(6,7); 
Trans(7,7)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(7)+1/k(3))+1/(1/k(7)+1/k(6))+1/(1/k(7)+1/k(8))+1/(1/k(7)+1/k(11))); 
Trans(7,8)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(7)+1/k(8))); 
Trans(7,11)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(7)+1/k(11))); 
Trans(8,4)=Trans(4,8); 
Trans(8,7)=Trans(7,8); 
Trans(8,8)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(8)+1/k(4))+1/(1/k(8)+1/k(7))+1/(1/k(8)+1/k(12))); 
Trans(8,12)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(8)+1/k(12))); 
Trans(9,5)=Trans(5,9); 
Trans(9,9)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(9)+1/k(5))+1/(1/k(9)+1/k(10))+1/(1/k(9)+1/k(13))); 
Trans(9,10)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(9)+1/k(10))); 
Trans(9,13)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(9)+1/k(13))); 
Trans(10,6)=Trans(6,10); 
Trans(10,9)=Trans(9,10); 
Trans(10,10)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(10)+1/k(6))+1/(1/k(10)+1/k(9))+1/(1/k(10)+1/k(11))+1/(1/k(10)+1/k(14))); 
Trans(10,11)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(10)+1/k(11))); 
Trans(10,14)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(10)+1/k(14))); 
Trans(11,7)=Trans(7,11); 
Trans(11,10)=Trans(10,11); 
Trans(11,11)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(11)+1/k(7))+1/(1/k(11)+1/k(10))+1/(1/k(11)+1/k(12))+1/(1/k(11)+1/k(15))); 
Trans(11,12)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(11)+1/k(12))); 
Trans(11,15)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(11)+1/k(15))); 
Trans(12,8)=Trans(8,12); 
Trans(12,11)=Trans(11,12); 
Trans(12,12)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(12)+1/k(8))+1/(1/k(12)+1/k(11))+1/(1/k(12)+1/k(16))); 
Trans(12,16)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(12)+1/k(16))); 
Trans(13,9)=Trans(9,13); 
Trans(13,13)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(13)+1/k(9))+1/(1/k(13)+1/k(14))); 
Trans(13,14)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(13)+1/k(14))); 
Trans(14,10)=Trans(10,14); 
Trans(14,13)=Trans(13,14); 
Trans(14,14)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(14)+1/k(10))+1/(1/k(14)+1/k(13))+1/(1/k(14)+1/k(15))); 
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Trans(14,15)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(14)+1/k(15))); 
Trans(15,11)=Trans(11,15); 
Trans(15,14)=Trans(14,15); 
Trans(15,15)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(15)+1/k(11))+1/(1/k(15)+1/k(14))+1/(1/k(15)+1/k(16))); 
Trans(15,16)=-2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(15)+1/k(16))); 
Trans(16,12)=Trans(12,16); 
Trans(16,15)=Trans(15,16); 
Trans(16,16)=poro*vb*ct+2*delt*delz/mu*(1/(1/k(16)+1/k(12))+1/(1/k(16)+1/k(15))); 
prod_ind=num_well*2*3.1415926*k(well_loc)*delz/mu/(0.5*log(4*grid_area/num_well/ca/0.1524/0.1524/(exp(0.5772)))+skin); 
  
% q>qlim? Try pressure specific first 
p_old=p_hist(:,1)*poro*vb*ct; 
Trans(well_loc,well_loc)=Trans(well_loc,well_loc)+delt*prod_ind; 
p_old(well_loc)=p_old(well_loc)+delt*prod_ind*pwf; 
inv_trans=inv(Trans); 
p_trial=inv_trans * p_old; 
q_trial=prod_ind*(p_trial(well_loc)-pwf); 
disc_oil_rcvry=0; 
time_step=0; 
time_step_qlim=0; 
     
% If qini is estimated to be larger than qlim, use a constant-q model 
if q_trial>qlim 
    Trans(well_loc,well_loc)=Trans(well_loc,well_loc)-delt*prod_ind; 
    inv_trans=inv(Trans); 
end 
while (q_trial>qlim) && (time_step*delt<end_t) 
    time_step=time_step+1; 
    p_old=p_hist(:,time_step)*poro*vb*ct; 
    p_old(well_loc)=p_old(well_loc)-delt*qlim; 
    p_hist=horzcat(p_hist,inv_trans * p_old); 
    disc_oil_rcvry=disc_oil_rcvry+qlim*delt*(1/(1+disc_rate))^(1+fix(delt*time_step/60/60/24/30/12-1/60/60/24/30/12)); 
    temp_oil_rcvry=vertcat(temp_oil_rcvry,qlim*delt); 
    q_trial=prod_ind*(p_hist(well_loc,time_step+1)-pwf); 
    oil_rcvry_qlim=disc_oil_rcvry; 
    time_step_qlim=time_step; 
end   
 
%Use constant-p model 
if time_step>1 && (time_step*delt<end_t) 
    disc_oil_rcvry=disc_oil_rcvry-qlim*delt*(1/(1+disc_rate))^(1+fix(delt*time_step/60/60/24/30/12-1/60/60/24/30/12));     
    p_hist=p_hist(:,1:time_step); 
    Trans(well_loc,well_loc)=Trans(well_loc,well_loc)+delt*prod_ind; 
    p_old(well_loc)=p_old(well_loc)+delt*prod_ind*pwf+delt*qlim;     
    inv_trans=inv(Trans); 
    q_trial=qlim*0.9; % 0.9 is an arbitrary number to make q_trial less than qlim for next production phase 
    time_step=time_step-1; 
end 
while (q_trial<qlim) && (time_step*delt<end_t) 
    time_step=time_step+1;  
    time_step_decay=time_step-time_step_qlim;     
    p_old=p_hist(:,time_step)*poro*vb*ct; 
    p_old(well_loc)=p_old(well_loc)+delt*prod_ind*pwf; 
    p_hist=horzcat(p_hist,inv_trans * p_old); 
    disc_oil_rcvry=disc_oil_rcvry+delt*prod_ind*(0.5*(p_hist(well_loc,time_step)+p_hist(well_loc,time_step+1))-
pwf)*(1/(1+disc_rate))^(1+fix(delt*time_step/60/60/24/30/12-1/60/60/24/30/12)); 
 temp_oil_rcvry=vertcat(temp_oil_rcvry,delt*prod_ind*(0.5*(p_hist(well_loc,time_step)+p_hist(well_loc,time_step+1))-pwf)); 
    q_trial=prod_ind*(p_hist(well_loc,time_step+1)-pwf); 
end 
recovery(1,num_well)=disc_oil_rcvry; 
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